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What can theory tell us about war and the role of planning therein? This thesis 
attempts to answer that question by using Carl von Clausewitz's theories on war and the 
mathematical theory of chaos to analyze war in general and the Vietnam War in particular. 
It offers a critical analysis of operational planning conducted by the United States Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) during the years of greatest involvement by 
American forces, 1966 - 1971. Viewing war through the dual lenses of Clausewitz and 
chaos theory, it argues that war tends toward one of two ideal types, conventional or 
popular. This typology of war is the result of the interplay of its essential components, 
which are described by Clausewitz and correspond to a characteristic of a chaotic system. 
Conventional and popular wars are qualitatively distinct and require qualitatively 
differentiated responses. The thesis further argues that the Vietnam War displayed the 
characteristics of a popular war during the 1966 - 1971 time frame. Lastly, it argues that 
the operational planning conducted by MACV failed to account for the popular nature of 
the Vietnam War and exacerbated the deteriorating situation facing it by pursuing policies 
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This paper seeks to explicate and analyze the essential components of war 
identified by the Prussian military theorist and soldier, Carl von Clausewitz and examine 
the operational plans produced by the United States Military Advisory Command, 
Vietnam (MACV) from 1966 - 1971. It uses the mathematical theory of chaos to bring 
Clausewitz's theory of war into closer focus and produce an analysis with finer granularity 
than is possible using the text of On War alone. It does this by treating the fundamental 
characteristics of war discussed in Clausewitz's work as components of a chaotic system, 
drawing some conclusions about the nature of war in general, and exploring MACV's 
operational plans within this framework. The treatment of war in this way reveals that 
MACVs campaign plans failed to adapt to the situation in Vietnam. 
Dogmatic and predictive interpretations of On War violate the essence of 
Clausewitz's work, which, as the title implies, is an exploration of war's essential character. 
Much of the confusion surrounding On War derives from its unfinished state and the 
unique approach the author took in analyzing war. This method employed the use of 
diatic pairs of characteristics, such as attack and defense or friction and genius, which 
interact with each other to define war's character. By citing only half of one of 
Clausewitz's pairs, his "critics" and "disciples" could manipulate his theory and turn it in to 
a positive doctrine. Thus Clausewitz is no more responsible for the "cult of the offensive" 
than one of the writers in the Bible is for the activities of a religious cult which blindly 
follows one verse of scripture and ignores its overarching message. One of the goals of 
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this paper is to demonstrate that the perception of Clausewitz as some sort of prophet of 
either total or limited war is a false dichotomy; his goal was the identification and 
explication of the essential components of war in general. Chaos theory provides a 
framework that resolves the apparent conflict between such concepts as order and 
disorder, pattern and randomness, and linearity and nonlinearity and thereby shows 
Clausewitz's appreciation of war as a unity of opposites. 
A more balanced view of On War reveals that the work's scope and purpose is to 
develop a framework for analyzing and studying the phenomenon of war. The 
mathematical theory of chaos, which studies complex and unpredictable behavior within 
simple systems, provides an excellent vehicle to clarify some of the essential ideas 
expounded by Clausewitz in On War and captures the essence ofthat work and its subject. 
It does this by offering an alternative framework for analysis that may improve our 
understanding of some of Clausewitz's admittedly difficult and ambiguous concepts. 
Analysis of war in this way reveals that, although each war is unique in its particulars, it 
always tends toward one of two types: conventional or popular.   Military power 
dominates the former and political power dominates the latter. Success in any particular 
war depends to a varying degree on the ability of each side to recognize and adapt to the 
type of conflict they are engaged in. 
An interpretation of On War using chaos theory provides a valuable way to 
analyze the constituent parts of war, including the subject of this thesis: operational 
planning by the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from 
1966 -1971. The theories of Clausewitz and chaos are the lenses used by this thesis to 
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conduct a critical analysis of MACVs planning, which is a good indicator of the overall 
direction of the United States' effort in Vietnam. This thesis argues that MACV failed to 
recognize the popular nature of the Vietnam War and its unique aspects in an attempt to 
impose a military solution on the situation. Rather than focusing on the security of the 
rural population of South Vietnam, which the political and social conditions indicated was 
the decisive aspect ofthat war, MACV generally focused on the defeat of the North 
Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong main forces. MACV did, of course, recognize that 
protection of the population was important in Vietnam and took steps toward pacification; 
notably General Abrams' attempt to unify the pacification and military efforts in his "one 
war" concept in 1970. This effort was a case of too little, too late, however, and the 
counterinsurgency effort never achieved the primary place that the context of the war 
demanded. 
The scope of this thesis goes beyond mere historical curiosity, however. The 
identification of war's essential components and their interaction with each other using 
Clausewitz and chaos theory shows to what extent it is of the conventional or popular 
type. This, in turn, should guide leadership at every level of the conflict in its planning and 








The author would like to thank Professors Daniel Moran and Dana Eyre for their 
guidance and encouragement and Ms. Jennifer Duncan for her able assistance and advice. 
He would also like to thank Doctor Graham Cosmas and the staff of the United States 
Army Center for Military History for their help in the research aspect of this thesis. 
Lastly, he would also like to thank Lisa F. Womack for her patience during the completion 
of this project. 
The author dedicates this thesis to the memory of Sergeant Richard B. Tuten, Jr., 
(1944 -1969) and the other 58,148 service members who gave "the last measure of their 







This paper seeks to explicate and analyze the essential components of war 
identified by the Prussian military theorist and soldier, Carl von Clausewitz and examine 
the operational plans produced by the United States Military Advisory Command, 
Vietnam (MACV) from 1966 - 1971. It uses the mathematical theory of chaos to bring 
Clausewitz's theory of war into closer focus and produce an analysis with finer granularity 
than is possible using the text of On War alone. It does this by treating the fundamental 
characteristics of war discussed in Clausewitz's work as components of a chaotic system, 
drawing some conclusions about the nature of war in general, and exploring MACVs 
operational plans within this framework. The treatment of war in this way reveals that 
MACVs campaign plans failed to adapt to the situation in Vietnam. 
Dogmatic and predictive interpretations of On War violate the essence of 
Clausewitz's work, which, as the title implies, he envisioned as an exploration of war's 
essential character. Of such approaches to war Clausewitz comments: 
It is only analytically that these attempts at theory can be called advances in 
the realm of truth; synthetically, in the rules and regulations they offer, they 
are absolutely useless. They aim at fixed values; but in war everything is 
uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities. They 
direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas all 
military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects. They 
consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of a continuous 
interaction of opposites. (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 136) 
Much of the confusion surrounding On War derives from its unfinished state and the 
unique approach the author took in analyzing war. This method employed the use of 
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diatic pairs of characteristics, such as attack and defense or friction and genius, which 
interact with each other to define war's character. By citing only half of one of 
Clausewitz's pairs, his "critics" and "disciples" could manipulate his theory and turn it in to 
a positive doctrine. Thus Clausewitz is no more responsible for the "cult of the offensive" 
than one of the writers in the Bible is for the activities of a religious cult which blindly 
follows one verse of scripture and ignores its overarching message. Christopher Brassford 
comments in his book, Qausewitz in English: 
A historical examination of the various uses and interpretations made of the 
philosopher's works may also help our understanding the actual messages 
that those works convey. It is, after all, changing historical circumstances 
rather than the actual content of his work that have led to Clausewitz's 
being called in different eras the "apostle of total war" and "the preeminent 
military and political strategist of limited war in modern times." (Bassford, 
1994: p.5) 
One of the goals of this paper is to demonstrate that the perception of Clausewitz as some 
sort of prophet of either total or limited war is a false dichotomy; his goal was the 
identification and explication of the essential components of war in general. Chaos theory 
provides a framework that resolves the apparent conflict between such concepts as order 
and disorder, pattern and randomness, and linearity and nonlinearity and thereby shows 
Clausewitz's appreciation of war as a unity of opposites. 
A more balanced view of On War reveals that the work's scope and purpose is to 
develop a framework for analyzing and studying the phenomenon of war. Historian Peter 
Paret sums up Clausewitz's view of theory in his book, Clausewitz and the State: 
As we know, he believed that it was not the role of theory to generate 
doctrine. "Our aim," he wrote in a characteristic passage in On War, "is 
not to provide new principles and methods of conducting war; rather we 




existed, and to trace it back to its basic elements." The task of theory was 
to clarify reality; or, more accurately, to help men clarify it by stimulating 
their minds and making them more sensitive to their surroundings - in 
Clausewitz's case, to their military surroundings. If theory interposed itself 
between the individual and the world, both theory and man failed. (Paret, 
1985: p. 328) 
The mathematical theory of chaos, which studies complex and unpredictable behavior 
within simple systems, provides an excellent vehicle to clarify some of the essential ideas 
expounded by Clausewitz in On War and captures the essence ofthat work and its subject. 
It does this by offering an alternative framework for analysis that may improve our 
understanding of some of Clausewitz's admittedly difficult and ambiguous concepts. 
An interpretation of On War using chaos theory provides a valuable way to 
analyze the constituent parts of war, including the subject of this thesis: operational 
planning by the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from 
1966 -1971.   "In short," writes Clausewitz, "a working theory is an essential basis for 
criticism." (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 157) The theories of Clausewitz and chaos are the 
"working theories" used by this thesis to conduct a critical analysis of MACVs planning. 
A report by the Long Range Planning Task Group (LRPTG) convened by General 
Creighton Abrams, Commanding General of MAC V from 1969 - 1972, underscores the 
importance ofthat headquarters in the conduct of the war: 
Because there is no effective, overall inter-departmental US planning body 
or joint US civil-military directive agency at either the US national or the 
US mission level, the first level at which the US effort in Vietnam can be 










Thus the campaign plans issued by MACV are indicative of the overall direction of the 
United States' effort in Vietnam. Of such plans Clausewitz commented to Major von 
Roeder in a letter dated December 22,1827: 
A war plan results directly from the political conditions of the two warring 
states, as well as from their relations to third powers. A plan of campaign 
results from the war plan, and frequently - if there is only one theater of 
operations - may even be identical with it. But the political element even 
enters the separate components of a campaign; rarely will it be without 
influence on such major episodes of warfare as a battle, etc. According to 
this point of view, there can be no question ofaptirefy military evaluation 
of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it. That 
this point of view is essential, that it is almost self-evident if we only keep 
the history of war in mind, scarcely needs proof. (Clausewitz, 1984: p. 9) 
This thesis argues that MACV made this very mistake by failing to recognize the political 
nature of the Vietnam War and its unique aspects in an attempt to impose a military 
solution on the situation. Rather than focusing on the security of the rural population of 
Vietnam, which the political and social conditions indicated was the decisive aspect ofthat 
war, MACV generally focused on the defeat of the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet 
Cong main forces. MACV did, of course, recognize that protection of the population was 
important in Vietnam and took steps toward pacification; notably General Abrams' 
attempt to unify the pacification and military efforts in his "one war" concept in 1970. 
This effort was a case of too little, too late, however, and the counterinsurgency effort 
never achieved the primary place that the context of the war demanded. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis argues that war, as Clausewitz understood it, resembles a chaotic 
mathematical system. Because this is not a technical report, much of the arcane jargon 
, 18







associated with the theory is omitted.1 Instead, the thesis uses only those mathematical 
terms and concepts which are critical to a general understanding of the philosophical 
implications of chaos theory for an epistemology of war, while remaining true to chaos 
theory's main tenets. Further, most of the discussion focuses on the first chapter of Book 
One of On War because that chapter explores the most basic characteristics of the subject 
and was considered by Clausewitz to be the only finished part of the entire work. 
(Clausewitz, 1989: p.70) The thesis also argues that wars tend to varying degrees toward 
one of two distinct types: conventional or popular; and that these types of war represent 
categorically different forms of warfare rather than a variance in intensity alone. Further, 
it argues that MACV failed to account for this fundamental feature of war and was, 
therefore, unsuccessful in its planning efforts. 
The thesis consists of nine chapters in addition to this introduction. Chapter n 
offers a general definition of chaos theory, explains its basic tenets, and shows that 
Clausewitz's theory of war captures the essence of chaos theory in its treatment of the 
subject. It does this by comparing the overall characteristics of a chaotic system with 
several of his general conceptions of war. It then uses this framework to show that wars 
vary not only in intensity - quantitatively - but also that they tend toward one of two types 
- a qualitative difference. After discussing the general types of war, popular and 
conventional, it establishes the overall context of the United States' involvement in 
Vietnam from 1966 - 1971. These years represent the peak time span of direct 
'This includes such terms as "strange attractors," "phase space," and "period doubling," as well as any 
mathematical equations, tables, or graphs. 
    l      





   
IT
 %   
1 
5 
participation by United States ground forces in combat operations. Lastly, it assesses the 
general effectiveness of MAC V in identifying which type of war it was engaged in and the 
efficacy of its operational planning in successfully prosecuting the war. 
Chapters III through DC address specific tenets of chaos theory and compare them 
to some of Clausewitz's ideas about war. Each chapter then demonstrates how each 
specific characteristic reveals how war tends to be of either a popular or conventional type 
and identifies the practical implications for this distinction. Lastly, each chapter 
operationalizes this distinction by illustrating that the United States faced a popular war in 
Vietnam from 1966 -1971 and offers a critical analysis of MACVs operational planning. 
In doing so it determines the results ofthat planning and assesses the extent to which 
theater level planning affected the conduct of the war in Vietnam. The primary focus of 
this section of each chapter is the combined campaign plans issued by MACV on a yearly 
basis, which outlined the goals for the year and provided guidance concerning the 
activities of the forces in the field.   These plans are compared to after-action reviews, 
contemporary studies, and general histories of the war in Vietnam to assess their outcome. 
Triangulation of these post - combat sources identifies trends in planning and execution 
that reveal the role of chaos in Vietnam and the efficacy of theater level planning in dealing 
with it. 
Chapter X summarizes the work and offers some general observations on what a 
chaotic approach to war reveals about its nature. It also draws some conclusions about 
the implications of war's tendency toward one of two distinct types and the role of 






In summary, then, the purpose of this paper is to use the theories of Carl von 
Clausewitz and the mathematical theory of chaos to shed light on war in general, and 
particularly on the operational planning done by MACV from 1966 -1971. Clausewitz's 
On War is the point of departure for the analysis of war, and chaos theory provides a more 
detailed and succinct way to identify the essential components and types of war. The role 
of these theories is, therefore, to provide a means to gain a further understanding of the 
phenomenon of war and the various forms it may take. The insights produced by theory 







Although the term chaos conjures images of complete disorder, this is not the 
meaning employed by chaos theory. Chaotic systems, in the mathematical sense of the 
word, are systems which consist of a finite number of components, called oscillators, that 
interact to produce unpredictable and complex behavior. Stephen Kellert, professor of 
philosophy of science at Indiana University and author of In the Wake of Chaos, provides 
the definition of chaos theory used in this paper: "Chaos theory is the qualitative study of 
unstable aperiodic behavior in deterministic nonlinear dynamical systems." (Kellert, 1993: 
p. 2) Specific uses of chaos theory include the study of turbulence in fluid motion, 
meteorology, planetary motion, and asteroid belts. (Ruelle, 1991: p. 78) Each of these 
systems exhibits paradoxical behavior worthy of a Zen koan: a mixture of order and 
disorder; predictability and unpredictability, randomness and pattern. The weather, for 
example, is predictable both in the short term and in the sense that it generally adheres to 
seasonal cycles. It is simultaneously unpredictable, however, because the specific systems 
that compose it cannot be accurately predicted beyond a week or two, nor can the severity 
or specific length of the seasons be predicted. Due to the impossibility of obtaining 
precise measurements or quantifying the basic dynamics of human activities, the exact 
study of chaotic human phenomena such as war remains impossible. David Ruelle, one of 
the founders of chaos theory, recognizes this and writes, "For such systems, then, the 
impact of chaos remains for the time being at the level of scientific philosophy rather than 
quantitative science." (Ruelle, 1991: p.79) For this reason this chapter will focus on 
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these philosophical considerations in lieu of a detailed examination of the mathematics 
involved in physical chaotic systems. 
B. CHAOS AND CLAUSEWITZ 
A philosophical view of chaos theory provides a bridge from the world of the 
"hard" sciences to that of human activity that is consistent with the realities posed by those 
activities. David Ruelle writes. 
Chance and randomness did not look like very promising topics for 
precise investigation, and were in fact shunned by many early scientists. 
Yet they now play a central role in our understanding of the nature of 
things... We have seen how we idealize the world around us in physical 
theories, and how chaos limits the intellectual control that we have on the 
evolution of the world. We have seen how a correct assessment of chance 
and predictability is important for everyday life and for history. (Ruelle, 
1991: p. 163) 
Carl von Clausewitz recognized the pervasive role of chance in war, which prompted him 
to write, "No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with 
chance." (Clausewitz, 1989: p.) The importance of a statement such as this cannot be 
overemphasized, for it challenges the ontology of those who would simplify war to a few 
positive principles and linear relationships. Clausewitz's theory of war, set forth in On 
War, contains many such statements and makes analogies to war that, in their very 
essence, resemble chaos theory. 
Clausewitz uses several analogies in On War to describe war in a general way. 
These analogies progress in increasing sophistication and each contains aspects of chaotic 
systems. The first is the image of war as a contest between two wrestlers. The second is 
the image of a card game. The last is that of a pendulum suspended between three 









highlight several of the specific similarities between the theory of war contained in On War 
and chaos theory. 
The first metaphor Clausewitz uses for war is that of a pair of wrestlers. He 
writes: 
War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up 
war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of 
wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his 
will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him 
incapable of further resistance. (Clausewitz, 1989: p.75) 
This seemingly obvious statement has the important implication that war, like a chaotic 
system, is interactive. Historian Alan Beyerchen notes of this illustration in his article, 
"Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and War": 
For Clausewitz, the interactive nature of war produces a system driven by 
psychological forces and characterized by positive feedback, leading "in 
theory" to limitless extremes of mutual exertion and efforts to get the better 
of one another. The course of a given war becomes thereby not the mere 
sequence of intentions and actions of each opponent, but the pattern or 
shape generated by mutually hostile intentions and simultaneously 
consequential actions. The contest is not the presence or actions of each 
opponent added together. It is the dynamic set of patterns made in the 
space between and around the contestants. (Beyerchen, 1993: p. 67) 
The interaction between the two wrestlers produces an unpredictable system that, like any 
chaotic system, has predictable elements, such as the effect of the weight and skill of the 
opponents. Further, it contains pattern in the form of a bounded space and rules of 
conduct, yet leaves room for the entrance of chance into the interaction. Like chaotic 
systems, the struggle has a finite number of components and outcomes yet remains 








This does not mean, however, that linearities are not present in such a contest. All 
other things being equal, the larger wrestler will win a match just as the side with the 
biggest battalions will win a battle. One of Clausewitz's points is that "other things" can 
never be counted on to be equal: the speed and technique of each wrestler matter, as does 
the intervention of chance into the interaction of the opposing sides. Context, then, plays 
a vital role and contributes to the unstable nature of war. 
The next analogy made by Clausewitz to depict war is that of a card game. He 
writes, "From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck 
and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the 
whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards." 
(Clausewitz, 1989: p. 86) Again this simple analogy emphasizes the importance of 
interaction. Like the wrestling analogy, the card game image includes many of the basic 
elements of chaotic systems - unpredictability, randomness, and interaction - all in a 
system that has a finite number of components and possible outcomes. It is more 
sophisticated than the wrestling analogy due to the overt addition of the element of chance 
caused by the shuffling of the cards and the element of calculated risk implied in the 
bidding associated with games of chance between opponents. 
The last analogy for war used by Clausewitz that resembles a chaotic system is a 
comparison to the Christian Trinity, represented in his work by a pendulum suspended 
between three magnets composed of the people of a state, its government, and its armed 
forces. Of these forces he writes: 
These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in 










that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship 
between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this 
reason alone it would be totally useless. Our task, therefore is to develop a 
theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an 
object suspended between three magnets. (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 89) 
Although this analogy refers mainly to the characteristics of individual belligerents rather 
than to war itself, it still captures the essence of a chaotic system because the three 
magnets interact with the pendulum in different ways. As Clausewitz suggests, the 
strengths and distances between the magnets are not constant, which results in a system 
that behaves unpredictably yet remains constrained by the forces exerted by the magnets. 
Rather than the image of a pendulum suspended motionless between three equidistant 
magnets of equal strength, the accurate image is one of a pendulum swinging wildly and 
unpredictably as the forces and distances between the magnets exert their varying 
influence on it. 
C. CHAOS, CLAUSEWITZ, AND COMBAT 
Viewing war through the lens of both Clausewitz and chaos theory reveals that 
wars vary not only in intensity but in a qualitative way. Clausewitz wrote in a note of 10 
July 1827 that he intended to revise On War in the light of this fact, although his early 
death prevented the revision of any more than Book One. He writes: 
War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to 
overthrow the enemy - to render him politically helpless or militarily 
impotent, thus forcing him to sign whatever peace we please; or merely to 
occupy some of his frontier-districts so that we can annex them or use 
them for bargaining at the peace negotiations. Transitions from one type to 
the other will of course recur in my treatment; but the fact that the aims of 
the two types are quite different must be clear at all times, and their points 
of irreconcilability brought out. (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 69) 
13 
t t i r  on  t   t fi   t r  l ti i  
t  t  l  li t it  lit      t r i  
 l  it l   t t ll  l .  ,  i   l  
 t i         
    .  8
 i  l   l     
     








 j ti  
t   
  
 it , : .
 
Thus Clausewitz argues that wars vary not only in the intensity of their execution, but in 
the intensity of their aims. 
An appreciation of chaos theory expands Clausewitz's concept of two types of war 
by revealing that the distinction between the types is not only in the intensity of its conduct 
and the totality of its aims, but that war tends toward one of two completely different 
kinds: conventional war versus popular war. The dynamics, interactions, and effects of 
chance discussed by Clausewitz combine in different ways to produce this qualitative 
difference. Nuclear war is a third possible kind of war, but is not discussed in this paper 
for the sake of brevity and because it was not a factor in MACVs planning during the 
United States' involvement in Vietnam.2 Chaos theory allows us to make this typological 
distinction because chaotic systems exhibit this trait. Stephen Kellert writes: 
The crucial point here is the distinction between specific 
quantitative predictions, the usual sort of which are impossible for chaotic 
systems, and qualitative predictions, which are at the heart of dynamical 
systems theory... Qualitative understanding is complimentary; it predicts 
properties of a system that will remain valid for very long times and usually 
for all future time. (Kellert, 1993: p. 101) 
Thus chaos theory seeks to identify the various forms that chaotic phenomena and their 
subsystems take rather than achieve a quantitative "solution" to any particular system. 
A qualitative understanding of war, one similar to that which Clausewitz had, 
means that conventional and popular wars are completely different in a theoretical sense: 
they represent ideal types. In reality, any war will exhibit characteristics of both but will 
tend toward one or the other type. As in a chaotic system, any particular war may also 
ZMACV explicitly assumed that neither the Soviet Union nor the People's Republic of China would directly 








change types at any time for reasons that may be a result of chance. The context of any 
given war at any given time will determine which type of war it is. Fortunately, it is 
possible to determine what type of conflict one is facing by examining its constituent parts. 
War, like any chaotic system, consists of a finite number of interacting parts whose 
properties can be analyzed and identified. This analysis reveals the nature of the war being 
examined and shows whether it tends toward the popular or conventional type. This, in 
turn, has implications for the operational commander in a war, who must successfully 
adapt to the type of war being waged. 
The distinctions between popular war and conventional war are obvious, yet the 
belief that they differ only in "intensity" and that they can be successfully waged in the 
same manner persists. Other common phrases used for popular war are low intensity 
conflict, operations other than war, insurgency, revolutionary war, political violence, 
internal war, and wars of national liberation. John Shy describes a popular war in the 
second edition of Makers of Modern Strategy under the rubric of revolutionary war. He 
writes: 
"Revolutionary war" refers to the seizure of political power by the use of 
armed force. Not everyone would accept such a simple definition, and 
indeed the term has other connotations: that the seizure of power is by a 
popular or broad - based political movement, that the seizure entails a fairly 
long period of armed conflict, and that power is seized in order to carry out 
a well - advertised political or social program. (Paret, 1986: p. 817) 
Due to the rhetorical baggage associated with the word "revolutionary," this paper uses 
the term popular war because it is broad enough to include all forms of domestic violence 
that seek political power at the expense of the current regime yet keeps these phenomena 
in the category of war. In general, popular wars include overt struggle for popular 
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support, or "winning the hearts and minds" of the population. This manifests itself by the 
use of limited force by small units who are integrated into the surrounding population, 
decentralized command and control by political leaders who may or may not be state 
actors, and total political aims intended to gain or maintain power at the expense of the 
opponent. 
Conventional war, in contrast, is dominated by military conflict in pursuit of 
political goals by established political entities. It exhibits the use of massive force by large 
military units that operate independently (i.e., they are not directly tied to the surrounding 
population). These military forces operate under centralized command and control by 
state leaders in pursuit of goals that may or may not entail the complete defeat of the 
enemy. Unlike popular war, in which stakes are "winner take all," it is not necessarily a 
"zero sum game." 
The qualitative distinction between popular and conventional war has operational 
implications for an external intervener. Recognition of the type of war facing a 
prospective outside power is critical to the successful prosecution ofthat war, and no 
amount of physical power can overcome the intellectual failure of fighting the wrong war 
using the wrong instruments. Historian Larry Cable writes: 
War exists first as an idea. Before men and materiel are assembled, long 
before the fear and exhilaration of combat, very long before the 
consequences become apparent, war exists as an idea in the minds of policy 
makers and military commanders alike. The conceptualizations of war 
which exist in the minds of those who make and execute national security 
policy will in large measure govern the outcome of war. Bad concepts 
assure a bad outcome. Material strength and technological sophistication 
cannot redeem a faulty idea. (Cable, 1991: p. vii) 





chaotic phenomenon, and recognition of this pattern - whether a war tends toward the 
popular or conventional variety - is the first step in achieving a successful outcome. 
The primacy of the fight for popular support in the former type of war places a 
premium on reliance on the host government because it can exercise greater political 
power over its population than an external government. Further, the primary operational 
goal in a popular war is political: to establish social control via a legitimate host 
government. Then it is possible to separate the insurgents from the population and defeat 
them militarily. Pursuing a military victory without establishing social control is 
meaningless because the political infrastructure of the insurgents remains attached to the 
population. The United States' involvement in Vietnam is illustrative of this: defeating the 
military forces of North Vietnam in the sparsely populated central highlands was 
meaningless without winning the political war waged by the Viet Cong in the coastal 
plains. 
In conventional war the military conflict is dominant, and military power 
determines the result. The primary operational goal is the erosion of the other state's will 
to continue the struggle by the defeat of his armed forces, the occupation of strategic 
terrain, or wearing him out in a protracted war of attrition. Once this has been done the 
opposing state collapses, surrenders, or agrees to negotiations, and the victors establish 
the peace: a reversal of the process in internal war. Pursuing military victory in a 
conventional war is the primary means to the political end. The United States' 
involvement in the Gulf War in 1990 is an example of this type of war: the military defeat 
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of Iraq's armed forces produced an armistice that enabled the Kuwaiti government to 
reestablish control over its population. 
Identification of whether an external power is involved in a popular or 
conventional war is critical to any decisions regarding how that power acts. The side that 
retains the initiative determines what type of war will occur at its outset. In the case of 
intervention, the side that instigated the war initially has that initiative. Iraq, for example, 
began the Gulf War in a conventional manner and the United States countered it with a 
like response. The Viet Cong, in contrast, were engaged in a popular war when the 
United States intervened. Fighting in a conventional manner in a popular war is thus 
inimicable to establishing social control because its focus is not on the political defeat of 
the insurgent's infrastructure but on the miliary defeat of their armed forces, which can be 
regenerated by the political arm. Defeat of the political arm of an insurgency first by 
destroying the political infrastructure and gaining control over the host country's 
population renders the military arm vulnerable to defeat because it can no longer be 
regenerated and cannot bide amongst the population. 
D. THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM, 1966 - 1971 
The question whether the Vietnam War was an insurgency or conventional war is a 
subject that bedeviled the participants at the time and has preoccupied historians ever 
since. Roger Beaumont writes in his book, War r Chaos and History: 
Many postmortems of the Vietnam War reflected frustration at being 
unable to mold the bewildering collage of events, motives, and so on, into a 
coherent configuration, and at not being able to wade in with the proverbial 
gloves off... Vietnam, if plotted on a spectrum of warfare running from 
minimum complexity to chaos, would be seen as lying far closer to the 





This section argues that the Vietnam War was primarily a popular war until after the 
withdrawal of United States combat forces in 1972, when it gradually changed into a 
conventional war culminating in the successful invasion of the Republic of South Vietnam 
by the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) in 1975. 
The last section indicated that the belligerent in a conflict that had the initiative in 
any given war would determine what type of war it was. In the case of intervention, this 
necessarily means that initially the external intervener does not have the initiative because 
it is reacting to the activities of another power. The Vietnam War is no exception to this 
idea: the United States employed ground forces in 1965 in reaction to Viet Cong attacks 
on vital air bases and it was never able to take the initiative away from either the Viet 
Cong or the Democratic Republic of Vietnam during the entire conflict. A case study on 
the Vietnam War in a Harvard University National Security Program Discussion Paper on 
low intensity conflict concludes: 
In retrospect, there is little doubt who scripted the ebb and flow of the war 
in Vietnam. From the Viet Cong terror attacks in downtown Saigon to the 
country - wide Tet Offensive, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 
guerrillas had their hands on the strategic throttle of the war. They 
controlled the war's rhythm to suit their battlefield and psychological 
warfare needs. (Crane, et al., 1988: p. 240) 
The Viet Cong, and later the North Vietnamese, determined the character of the war in 
spite of the United States' efforts to impose its will on the situation because they continued 
to fight a popular war while the United States attempted to make it a conventional one. 
Once the United States lost the popular war, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was 
free to mobilize, train, and employ its conventional forces against those of the Republic of 
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South Vietnam, which, without direct military support from the United States, were 
unable to stop the onslaught. 
The type of war chosen by its protagonists prior to 1975, the Viet Cong and their 
North Vietnamese allies, was a popular one which was designed to exhaust the United 
States. There were some unsuccessful attempts to win conventional battles, notably parts 
of the 1968 Tet Offensive and the 1972 Easter Offensive, but defeat in these operations 
only forced the communists to revert to popular war until they had the strength to 
overwhelm South Vietnam's forces after the United States lost heart and quit the field. 
The predominant role of the Viet Cong as an independent organization with tenuous ties 
to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is indicative of the popular nature of the conflict. 
George Ball, Undersecretary of State for the Johnson Administration, sent a memorandum 
to Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on the 
eve of the commitment of ground combat forces to Vietnam that assessed the relative 
roles of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. He writes, "The Viet Cong - while 
supported and guided from the North - is largely an indigenous movement. Although we 
have emphasized the Cold War aspects, the conflict in South Vietnam is essentially a civil 
war within that country." (Cable, 1986: p. 270) It was this indigenous movement that 
established the context of the United States' involvement in Vietnam at its outset. 
The Viet Cong, and later the North Vietnamese, chose a popular war as the 
mechanism to defeat the United States. To do this they infiltrated cadre into the heavily 
populated and disaffected coastal plain and Mekong Delta areas by inserting permanent 
cells into each hamlet, which was the basic political unit of rural Vietnam at the time. 
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Larger units of Viet Cong and PAVN forces operated in the sparsely populated central 
highlands to draw the combat power and other resources of the United States and the 
Republic of Vietnam away from the areas of importance in a popular war: the heavily 
populated regions. Further, they applied limited, discriminate coercion in these areas and 
relied heavily on psychological warfare and political indoctrination to win the population 
to their side. This provided a source of recruitment for losses sustained by main force 
units operating in the hinterland, as well as food and some measure of security. This 
campaign continued until the North Vietnamese felt they had enough force to defeat their 
enemy conventionally, which they finally did in 1975 after the failed attempts of 1968 and 
1972. 
The popular nature of the war in Vietnam demanded a response from MACV that 
countered the Viet Cong's strategy and took the initiative from them where it mattered the 
most: in the hamlets on the coastal plain and Mekong Delta regions. Defeating the 
insurgency meant winning the political battle by providing the hamlets with meaningful 
security and permanent government presence. Specifically, operational planning by 
MACV had to offer a response that placed a premium on host government participation in 
an integrated civil - military system that primarily policed the regions of Viet Cong cell 
activity while keeping an eye on possible conventional troop movements by the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The next section will assess MACVs operational 
planning in a general way. 
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E. OPERATIONAL PLANNING IN VIETNAM, 1966 - 1971 
MACV foiled, particularly in the years 1966 -1969, to emphasize the popular 
aspect of the Vietnam War until it was too late. The mission statement of the combined 
campaign plan for 1966 states, "The mission of RVNAF [Republic of Vietnam Armed 
Forces] and US/FWMA [United States/Free World Military Assistance] forces is to defeat 
the VC [Vietcong] and extend GVN [Government of Vietnam] control in the Republic of 
Vietnam." (MACV, 1966: p. 153) The mission statements for 1967,1968, and 1969 are 
similar, stating, "The mission of RVNAF and US/FWMAF is to defeat the VC/NVA 
[North Vietnamese Army] forces and to extend GVN control throughout the Republic of 
Vietnam." (MACV, 1967: p.5; 1968: p. 2; 1969: p. 2) Although these mission 
statements include the extension of political power by the Republic of Vietnam as part of 
the mission, it comes after the mission to defeat the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese and 
makes no mention of providing meaningful and lasting security to the population of South 
Vietnam. 
The mission statements in the campaign plans for 1970 and 1971 show a marked 
improvement in focusing attention on security for the population. The 1970 mission 
statement reads, "The mission of RVNAF and FWMAF is to assure the security of the 
Vietnamese people by defeating the VC/NVA forces and by participating in the 
government Pacification and Development Plan, especially in the program to neutralize the 
VCI [Viet Cong Infrastructure], throughout the Republic of Vietnam." (MACV, 1970: p. 
2) The mission for 1971 is identical except for the removal of the counter VCI phrase. 










first means listed to obtain security is defeat of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese main 
units. The mission statements, particularly in 1970 and 1971, give pacification a major 
role and place it on an almost equal footing with the large unit war. 
The commander's concept of the operation is a statement of how the commander 
visualizes the accomplishment of his mission and establishes the parameters in which his 
subordinates will operate. The MACV Commanders, General William C. Westmoreland 
(1965 -1968) and General Creighton Abrams (1968 - 1972) used this vehicle in the 
combined campaign plans to communicate their ideas of how the campaign should 
proceed to accomplish the aforementioned missions. In general, both commanders failed 
to place population security as a top priority in their concepts. 
In 1966 General Westmoreland sought to accomplish the following tasks in this 
order: 
1) Establish and defend major bases. 
2) Defend governmental centers and secure resources. 
3) Open main roads, railroads, and waterways. 
4) Mount sustained ground and air operations against VC forces and bases. 
5) Frustrate the VC strategy. 
6) Provide security for expansion of GVN control. 
7) Interdict VC land and water routes of infiltration. 
8) Provide combat and logistics air support. (MACV, 1966: p. 154) 
He planned to accomplish this mission by having both the United States and South 
Vietnamese forces focus on all of the listed tasks. Conspicuous by its absence is any 
mention of population protection or long term security beyond the vague "frustrate the 
VC strategy." Providing for the expansion of the Republic of Vietnam's control is as close 
as the order gets, and this task is relegated to the sixth place out of eight. 
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The 1967 concept within the campaign plan contrasts with the 1966 one in several 
ways. Rather than a terse list of tasks, the concept of the operation is a five page 
narrative. United States and South Vietnamese forces have different foci in the 1967 
order: the former concentrating on destruction of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese main 
forces and the latter focusing on pacification, known in the order as Revolutionary 
Development. Its main focus is on"... a strategic and tactical offensive in consonance 
with political, economic, and sociological programs of GVN and US/FW agencies." 
(MACV, 1967: p. 4) This offensive was to occur via the aforementioned division of labor 
plus operations designed to eliminate the VCI, increase operational tempo on surface lines 
of communication to reduce the dependence on airlift for logistics, neutralization of the 
enemy's base areas, control of priority areas [major cities and military bases], border 
surveillance and interdiction, increased use of air and naval power, and psychological 
warfare. (MACV, 1967: pp. 4-9) The establishment of a division of labor giving the 
United States forces control of the large unit war and the South Vietnamese forces control 
of Revolutionary Development and the lack of emphasis on pacification of the countryside 
in the description of the concept inevitably led to the bulk of the United States' attention 
and resources going to the conventional war rather than the popular one. 
The 1968 plan used the same division of labor but listed only three tasks in its 
concept: containment and anti - invasion operations along the borders of South Vietnam, 
sustained and unrelenting offensive pressure on VC/NVA base areas, and support of the 
pacification effort. (MACV, 1969: p. 6) Again, the tasks appeared in order of 
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importance and relegated pacification to the last position and the division of labor 
continued to focus United States' attention and resources on the large unit war. 
The 1969 plan, under General Abrams' leadership, altered the division of labor and 
focused even more attention on the large unit war. In this instance the regular forces of 
South Vietnam would join the United States in conducting the war against the Viet Cong 
and North Vietnamese main forces and the irregular popular and regional forces would 
assume the pacification effort. This plan lists four tasks in this order: a sustained 
offensive against VC/NVA forces and bases, border surveillance and interdiction, 
protection of major cities, and pacification conducted by territorial security forces. 
(MACV, 1969: p. 5) Again, the focus of the campaign plan is on the large unit war and 
relegates the popular war to an even smaller role by focusing the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam on the conventional war and leaving the poorly resourced territorial forces in 
charge of the pacification effort. 
The 1970 campaign plan's concept focused on the impending withdrawal of United 
States forces from Vietnam and the attainment of a system that was not dependent upon 
direct participation by "free world military assistance forces."  To do this, General 
Abrams proposed to "... continue to conduct combined or unilateral operations to meet 
enemy formations and reduce selected base areas." (MACV, 1970: p. 6) This would 
reduce the external threat facing the Republic of Vietnam and, combined with the 
attainment of pacification and development goals, would eliminate the need for United 
States' forces. The 1971 concept was almost identical but more urgently stated the desire 





these concepts is that they assumed that pacification goals would be met without placing 
any emphasis on them. Again, American and South Vietnamese regular forces focused on 
the large unit war and territorial forces handled the pacification effort. This, in turn, 
focused most of the attention and resources on the conventional effort to the detriment of 
the popular effort. 
The combined campaign plans issued by MAC V were supposed to complement the 
Republic of Vietnam's Pacification and Development Plans issued in the same year. In 
fact, General Abrams enclosed a letter on English translations of the plan that were 
distributed to subordinate units that stated: 
The Pacification and Development Plan and the Combined 
Campaign Plan, AB 145, complement each other. The Pacification and 
Development Plan is, however, the authoritative document on pacification 
policies and where minor variations occur, the Pacification and 
Development Plan governs. (RVN, 1970: p. 1) 
A problem arises, however, where military policies not related to pacification conflict with 
the Pacification and Development Plan. The annex dealing with the participation of 
military forces in pacification in the 1970 plan called for both United States and South 
Vietnamese forces, regular and territorial, to provide security to the Vietnamese people by 
accomplishing the following tasks in this order: 
1) Maintaining continuous and permanent security for people living in 
secure areas. 
2) Extending security to people outside the secure areas. 
3) Neutralizing the local force, guerrillas, and VCI units or individuals 
found among the people. 
4) Forcing the withdrawal of NVA forces to North Vietnam, by both 
military and political actions. 
5) Creating a security system that is not dependent on the continued 
presence of FWMAF. (RVN, 1970: p. 1-1-2) 
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These tasks match the mission statement of the 1970 plan but do not conform to the 
concept elucidated in the campaign plan that emphasizes the large unit war. In spite of 
guidance dictating the primacy of pacification, it was the conventional war that received 
the most attention and resources. 
The conflicting guidance from MACV regarding the relative importance of the 
popular war versus the large unit war manifest itself in combat after action reports 
submitted by various units during the Vietnam War. The American 173rd Airborne 
Brigade and the Republic of Vietnams's 22nd infantry Division conducted a joint operation 
in August 1968 that is illustrative of one attempt to reconcile these missions. Operation 
Dan Sinh occurred in the Bong Son plains, a heavily populated rice producing region in 
the coastal plains. Their mission:'"... find, fix and destroy enemy forces, render 
inoperable the Viet Cong infrastructure and screen and reclassify all civilians living within 
the Bong Son plains area." (173rd, 1969: p. 4) To execute the mission the units 
formulated a three phase plan that first targeted large Viet Cong units, then attempted to 
separate the VCI from the population, then saturated the area with United States and 
South Vietnamese forces for two months. (173rd, 1969: pp. 4-7) The results of the 
operation were predictable to one familiar with popular war: the Viet Cong main forces 
pulled out rather than face the massive firepower of their conventional adversaries. United 
States Army Engineers used Rome Plows in the villages to destroy Viet Cong bunkers and 
trenches with collateral damage to much of the village. The displaced population (13,854) 
was screened by the National Police, who found 199 suspected VCI among them. After 






killed in action and 140 captured. (173rd, 1969: pp. 7-33) The long term effects of 
Operation Dan Sinn were effectively nil: the Viet Cong returned once the military left 
because there was no permanent government presence in the Bong Son plains, the 
villagers returned to their leveled huts and rebuilt the hamlets, and military forces would 
again return to the area to"... find, fix and destroy enemy forces, render inoperable the 
Viet Cong infrastructure and screen and reclassify all civilians living within the Bong Son 
plains area." 
General Abrams' LRPTG reached a similar conclusion in the same year that the 
173rd Airborne Brigade was conducting Operation Dan Sinh. Its report states: 
How are we doing? The most honest way to answer this question is: "We 
really aren't quite sure." And the reason, of course is the plethora of 
military and civilian agencies, each with its own individual - and often 
conflicting - goals, programs, and evaluation systems. However, based 
upon the two-fold nature of our effort, we believe we are generally 
succeeding in achieving conventional military goals but paradoxically not 
succeeding in establishing reasonable security, in the country-side. Also, 
we are falling short in the national development portion. (LRPTG, 1969: 
p. 29) 
The LRPTG's report reflects the same confusion over pacification and the conventional 
war that Operational Dan Sinh attempted to overcome by its three phased operation. It 
also shows the extent to which MAC V viewed the war as a conventional rather than a 
popular one. 
MAC Vs attempts to reconcile the pacification and large unit efforts in General 
Abrams' one war concept expressed in the 1970 and 1971 campaign plans occured too late 
and were too contradictory to overcome the conventional focus ofthat headquarters. 












summarizes the effects of the United States' focus on fighting a conventional war in 
Vietnam. He writes: 
The consequences of our conscious decision to give first priority to 
the defeat of the enemy regular forces in the field, using American forces 
almost exclusively, were wide ranging with many adverse ramifications. 
That decision diverted U.S. attention, priority of effort, and precious 
resources away from the primary task of developing South Vietnamese 
forces capable of defending their country from subversion or overt invasion 
from the North. (Palmer, 1984: p. 179) 
MACV, then, recognized that the war in Vietnam had some characteristics of a popular 
war but generally emphasized the conventional aspects of the conflict in its guidance. The 
dissonance created by relying heavily on conventional operations in a popular war 
heightened the chaos level of the Vietnam War and ultimately contributed to the United 
States' and South Vietnam's defeat. 
The following chapters discuss the specific characteristics of war that reveal 
whether it is a popular war or a conventional one. They do this by comparing each of the 
specific tenets of Kellert's definition of chaos theory3 with one of Clausewitz's ideas about 
war and identifying how those ideas are manifest in each type of war. They will then show 
that the United States was involved in a popular war in Vietnam from 1965 - 1972 and 
assess MACVs operational planning in that light. 









HI. THE DYNAMICS OF DUALISM 
A. CHAOS, CLAUSEWITZ, AND THE DYNAMICS OF WAR 
The first specific element of a chaotic system addressed in this paper is its 
dynamical nature. A dynamical system is simply one whose constituent parts and their 
interrelationships can be identified and mathematically expressed over time. Kellert 
describes it as one which "... is thus a simplified model for the time varying behavior of 
an actual system." (Kellert, 1993: p. 2) The term oscillator used by those familiar with 
chaos theory refers to the components of a system, such as the interaction of heat, gravity, 
and air in a convection system. War in its entirety cannot be mathematically expressed as 
a chaotic system because it is impossible to precisely determine the value of some of its 
components, such as moral considerations and political objectives. Philosophically, 
however, it does consist of interacting components that can be analyzed and it does evolve 
over time. Ruelle comments of such human phenomena, "We are left, therefore, with the 
tantalizing situation that we see time evolutions similar in some sense to those of chaotic 
physical systems, but sufficiently different that we cannot analyze them [mathematically] at 
this time." (Ruelle, 1991: p. 85) By dynamical, then, we mean a system which changes 
over time and consists of a set of identifiable interacting parts. 
Clausewkz's theory of war accounts for this aspect of Kellert's definition of a 
chaotic system. Like a dynamical system, war evolves over time and consists of an 
identifiable number of components and interrelationships. Clausewitz identifies both of 
these characteristics of war and discusses them in On War. Of the former he writes: 
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If war consisted of one decisive act or of a set of simultaneous decisions, 
preparations would tend toward totality, for no omission could ever be 
rectified. The sole criterion for preparations which the world of reality 
could provide would be the measures taken by the adversary - so far as 
they are known; the rest would once more be reduced to abstract 
calculations. But if the decision in war consists of several successive acts, 
then each of them, seen in context, will provide a gauge for those that 
follow. Here again, the abstract world is ousted by the real one and the 
trend to the extreme is thereby moderated. (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 79) 
Combined with the interaction of the components of Clausewitz's famous "paradoxical 
Trinity" of the people, policies, and armed forces of a state, this passage shows both time 
evolution in the system and some of the interacting parts of war. (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 
89) Beyerchen comments on the Trinity, "The nature of war should not be conceived as a 
stationary point among the members of the Trinity, but as a complex trajectory traced 
among them." (Beyerchen, 1993: p. 71) War as Clausewitz sees it, then, is a dynamical 
system that changes with time and consists of a finite number of interacting parts. 
War's dynamical nature points out the first distinction between conventional and 
popular war: the flow of events. Conventional wars begin with the formulation of 
political goals of varying importance and their pursuit by overt military means. Violent 
conflict results and centers on either physical terrain, such as a state capital or strategic 
area, or on the opposition's armed forces, with the ultimate aim of eroding the opponent's 
will to resist. The results of this military conflict determine the winner and peace is either 
imposed by the victor or negotiated between the two adversaries if they both conclude 
that, on certain terms, peace is in their interest. Diplomatic efforts and deployment time 
may result in an interruption of hostilities, but the flow of events follows this general path. 
Again, the Gulf War is a classic example of a conventional war: the United States 
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determined its political goals, deployed its forces and imposed its will on Iraq via military 
victory. 
Popular wars, in contrast, follow a general path from a militarily latent phase of 
political agitation and infrastructure building to one of guerilla warfare, which culminates 
in the third stage: a strategic offensive which follows the lines of a conventional war and 
seeks the outright defeat of the ruling government. The first phase attempts to fuse the 
insurgents to the population via psychological and political warfare against the regime and 
its external sponsor. The second phase weakens the government via attrition and cements 
the insurgents' control over the hinterland by developing base areas from which to strike, 
as well as the building of a conventional - style military force. The final phase is a 
conventional war with the total aim of overthrowing the existing regime. Transitions from 
one phase to the next and back occur as the system progresses and the guerrilla phase 
remains active throughout, but in the end either the insurgency wins or the state 
successfully gains control of its population and eliminates the insurgents. General Vo 
Nguyen Giap, the leader of the Viet Minn's military arm during the French Indochina war 
describes these phases in action: 
The general law of a long revolutionary war is usually to go through three 
stages: defensive, equilibrium, and offensive. Fundamentally, in the main 
directions, our Resistance War also followed this general law. Of course, 
the reality on the battlefields unfolded in a more lively and more 
complicated manner. Implementing the guiding principle of a long war, 
after a period of fighting to wear out and check the enemy troops, we 
carried out a strategic withdrawal from the cities to the countryside in 
order to preserve our forces and defend our rural bases. Following the 
failure of the enemy offensive in Viet Bac, equilibrium gradually came into 
being. We decided to launch an extensive guerilla war. From 1950 
onward, campaigns of local counter offensives were successively opened 





campaign in early 1954 was a big counter offensive which ended the 
Resistance War with a great victory. (Pomeroy, 1968: p. 215) 
Giap's statement reveals the general pattern of internal wars, be they "classic" wars of 
national liberation or more ambiguous ones like the recent conflict in Somalia. The war 
fought by the United States in Vietnam is another example of popular war: the Viet Cong 
successfully infiltrated the population and built a guerilla force. An attempt to go to the 
conventional phase during the 1968 Tet Offensive resulted in military defeat for the Viet 
Cong, which immediately returned to the guerilla phase of the war. Ultimately, the war 
ended in a conventional manner, but only after the United States lost politically in the first 
two stages and withdrew. 
The dynamical nature of the types of war have implications for the external 
intervener. If the flow of events, or successive acts in Clausewitz's parlance, follows the 
conventional path, then deployment of military force designed to fight over the physical or 
military terrain against an opposing armed force is vital to success. If, however, the war 
follows the popular path and has not yet reached the conventional war stage, then the 
primary actions of the intervener should be in the political and psychological realm and 
should be designed to bolster the host government and help it gain control over its 
population. To do this it must focus on the human terrain and on the bond between the 
insurgent and the population. Conventional military force cannot break this bond without 
alienating the population and strengthening their bond to the insurgents. This does not 
rule out the deployment of conventional force, which may be required in the event the 





the sponsor's intervention on counter insurgency. Conventional forces represent the 
"other war" in this conflict and pacification remains the main effort. 
B. THE DYNAMICS OF THE VIETNAM WAR, 1966 - 1971 
The Vietnam War closely followed the popular war dynamic and transitioned from 
one phase to the next and back again several times. By 1957, the latent phase of the war 
had turned into guerrilla war after the Republic of Vietnam's President, Ngo Dinh Diem 
politically disenfranchised and estranged the peasantry by cancelling local elections, 
installing Catholic officials in largely Buddhist villages, and bungling an attempt at land 
reform. Larry Cable describes this results of these policies in his book, Conflict of Myths: 
When the first rumblings of rural discontent were met by repressive moves 
from the security police under the direction of President Diem's brother, 
Nhu, it was scarcely remarkable that insurrection reared its head. While 
this incipient insurgency was certainly a more welcome development than 
the Marxist regime of Ho Chi Minh in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(DRV), as North Vietnam was more properly known, the insurgent 
movement neither started in Hanoi nor was controlled from there. (Cable, 
1986: p. 186) 
Thus the latest transition from the latent phase of the popular war, ongoing since the end 
of the French Indochinese war in 1954 returned the specter of guerilla war to the 
forefront. 
The guerilla warfare phase of the Vietnam War would continue uninterrupted until 
the Tet Offensive of 1968, when the Viet Cong, with the encouragement of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam unsuccessfully attempted to move the conflict to the 
conventional phase. The Tet Offensive was a turning point in the Vietnam War for two 
major reasons: it simultaneously decimated the Viet Cong, and crushed the United States' 
optimism that the war was progressing well. After the Tet Offensive, the war returned to 
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the guerilla phase, but now under the closer direction of the North Vietnamese, who took 
advantage of the devastating losses suffered by the then independent Viet Cong by 
inserting their own agents into the Viet Cong's existing infrastructure in a clever bit of 
Gleichschaltung. Stanley Karnow, author of Vietnam: A History, includes an interview 
with Dr. Duong Quynh Hoa, a former Viet Cong cadre member that describes this 
process: 
"We lost our best people," she said mournfully, recalling that Vietcong 
military units composed mostly of indigenous southerners had borne the 
brunt of the fighting and suffered the heaviest casualties. Over the next 
year, she went on, the southern Communist's political organization was to 
be badly battered by the CIA's Phoenix program, a covert campaign 
designed to uproot the Vietcong's rural structure. So growing numbers of 
North Vietnamese agents were sent south to fill the vacuum. They rebuilt 
the southern Communist apparatus, and they remained after the war to 
manage h - often antagonizing their southern comrades, who, despite an 
abstract commitment to national cohesion, clung to their regional identity. 
(Karnow, 1983: p. 547) 
The North Vietnamese continued the practices of their erstwhile "allies," the Viet Cong, 
until the ill - fated 1972 Easter Offensive, which was also unsuccessful. 
The third and final phase of the Vietnam War, the conventional one, finally 
succeeded in 1975, after the United States was forced to withdraw due to the high costs 
of continuing to fight the guerilla war. Thus the period of direct participation by United 
States ground forces, 1965 -1972, was a continuous guerilla war with two failed attempts 
at conventional war. The Viet Cong and Democratic Republic of Vietnam chose which 
phase the war would be in because they maintained political control of the population 







MACVs only hope of success during these years was to wrest the initiative from 
the Viet Cong prior to 1968 and North Vietnamese thereafter by winning the political 
battle over the human terrain of South Vietnam's population. Once the communist cadres 
were separated from the population they could be defeated in the countryside by 
conventional force or simply allowed to starve. Operational planning done by MACV, 
therefore, had to reflect an acknowledgement that the war was a popular one in its guerilla 
phase. In so doing, its plans needed to pursue the separation of the Viet Cong 
infrastructure from the population in the coastal plain and Mekong Delta regions by 
limited force and permanent presence. Conventional operations designed to combat main 
force units or respond to a cross border invasion by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
should have been a contingency, not the primary focus of theater planning. 
MACV failed to realize that the war was firmly in its guerilla phase and continued 
to place emphasis on countering the final phase threat of large scale military operations in 
spite of the enemy's continuous use of guerilla war both before and after the 1968 Tet 
Offensive. The combined campaign plans reflected this in the missions they assigned to 
their various subordinate units throughout the era of direct involvement by the United 
States. South Vietnamese air, naval, and ground regular forces received the vast majority 
of the resources expended in the Vietnam War not directly spent on United States forces 
and received more attention from politicians and the media than the territorial or police 
forces. The tasks assigned to these units by MACV, therefore, indicate the relative 
importance of their missions versus those assigned to the territorial or irregular forces. 
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The 1966 campaign plan did not explicitly list the tasks for the regular forces of 
each country involved, implying that both United States and Republic of Vietnam regular 
forces would share the burden of accomplishing the tasks listed on page 154, which 
ranged from protection of major military facilities to providing effective air support. In 
1967, however, MACV directed: 
Although RVNAF is assigned the primary responsibility of supporting 
Revolutionary Development and US/FWMAF are assigned the primary 
mission of destroying the main VC/NVA forces and bases, there will be no 
clear cut division of responsibility. RVNAF General Reserve and ARVN 
Corps Reserve units will conduct unilateral and participate in coordinated 
and combined search and destroy operations. US/FWMAF will continue to 
provide direct support and implicit aid to Revolutionary Development 
activities. (MACV, 1967: p. 6) 
This passage indicates the general foci of the two forces: United States ground troops on 
conventional operations and South Vietnamese ground troops on pacification. No specific 
mention is made of South Vietnamese territorial or police forces, although the latter were 
under the control of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. 
The campaign plans for 1968 and 1969 also give United States forces the primary 
task of defeating the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese main forces but increasingly give 
the regular forces of South Vietnam that role as well. The 1968 plan states that ARVN 
regular units"... will extend area security where necessary by conducting provincial 
search and destroy operation against VC local forces (including the provincial battalions) 
and against VC/NVA main force units where required." (MACV, 1968: p. 7) The 1969 
plan takes this a step a further, directing: 
ARVN divisional units will direct their primary efforts to the destruction of 
VC/NVA main force units. In order to provide maximum ARVN strength 
for the accomplishment of the primary mission, a gradual phase down of 
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ARVN battalions in support of pacification will occur. (MAC V, 1969: p. 
7) 
In these years, then, MACV intensified its focus on the conventional war by continuing to 
fight it with United States forces and drawing South Vietnamese regular units away from 
the pacification effort and into the large unit struggle. 
The 1970 campaign plan distinguishes between territorial and regular forces, and 
gives the latter the mission to: 
1. Locate and neutralize enemy main forces, base areas, and logistics 
systems in RVN. 
2. Deter enemy incursions into RVN along the DMZ, the Laotian and 
Cambodian borders, and in coastal waters. 
3. Prevent enemy incursions into consolidation zones and secure areas. 
(MACV, 1970: p.7) 
In this case there is no distinction between United States and Republic of Vietnam regular 
forces, which were given identical missions. The 1971 plan continues this trend, 
substituting the title "Mobile Field Forces'* for regular units and directing, "The primary 
mission of Infantry Divisions is to conduct mobile operations to locate and neutralize 
enemy main force units, base areas, and liaison, communications, and logistics systems." 
(MACV, 1971: p. 8)  Thus MACV increasingly employed host nation forces, whose 
permanent presence is vital in establishing a lasting and credible link with the population, 
in operations that took them farther away from the population they were supposed to 
defend, These forces then conducted conventional operations against Viet Cong and 
PAVN forces whose job was to draw attention away from the "other war." 
The Republic of Vietnam's Pacification and Development Plan, which MACVs 









both United States and South Vietnamese military forces on population protection. In a 
paragraph describing the role of military force in the conflict it states, "Providing security 
to the Vietnamese people is the major objective of RVNAF/FWMAF." (RVN, 1970: p. I- 
1-1) The evolution of the South Vietnamese military's role from one of pacification to one 
of conventional warfare violates the intent of the pacification plan and fails to recognize 
that the war in Vietnam was a popular one in its guerilla phase. 
Combat after - action reports point to the impact of the presence of security forces 
in the countryside. The 173rd Airborne Brigade's after - action report of Operation Dan 
Sinh, previously summarized, describes the conditions in the Bong Son plains area prior to 
the arrival of government forces: 
AO Cochise is the 173d Airborne Brigade's most densely populated area of 
operations, containing approximately 350,000 inhabitants. Of these, an 
estimated 215,000 are considered as living in areas of Viet Cong control or 
influence... Though rich and fertile, at the same time this "ricebowl" has 
long been a scourge for both Vietnamese and United States combat 
elements, as the plains area contains a high percentage of Viet Cong and 
Viet Cong sympathizers and is the home of two local force Viet Cong 
units. .. The Bong Son plains area also houses numerous hamlet and 
village - level Viet Cong units and possesses, in these hamlets and villages, 
a Viet Cong infrastructure that dates back into the days of French control 
of Vietnam. (173rd, 1969: p. 1) 
Operation Dan Sinh cleaned out the Bong Son plains area but did not do so permanently; 
once the regular forces departed the area it reverted to Viet Cong control. Thus the 
concentrated use of conventional forces to clear areas was ineffective because the 
temporary nature of the security they provided allowed the communists to reestablish 








An operation conducted by the United States 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment also 
underscores the value of the presence of security forces in the countryside. It states: 
Operation Dan Tarn 81 was successful in its immediate goal of securing the 
rice harvest operation in the VO DAT - TAN LINH area. The fact that the 
harvest was accomplished with complete freedom from Viet Cong 
harassment was no doubt a result of the dual threat imposed by ARVN 
security forces, and the presence of the Squadron as a mobile force capable 
of striking anywhere in the area on short notice. The side effects of the 
operation were several. It was noted that the flow of commerce into the 
area increased sharply during the period, a direct result of the increased 
presence of friendly troops and the route security effort. (1 IthACR, 1967: 
p. 8) 
Unfortunately, the increased presence of friendly troops was temporary, and the departure 
of the cavalry and its South Vietnamese counterparts from the area left the area open to 
infiltration and influence by the Viet Cong. 
MACVs insistence on increased South Vietnamese participation in the large unit, 
mobile war stripped the countryside of security forces whose presence could have made 
government control of the heavily populated coastal plains and Mekong Delta regions a 
reality. Instead, the task of population control was left to poorly equipped and 
indifferently led territorial forces. An after action review from the United States 5th 
Special Forces Group in 1967 lists the equipment used by territorial forces to secure local 
areas. The entire list is of World War II vintage with the exception of M79 grenade 
launchers and PRC - 25 radios. (5thSFG, 1967: p. 2) Further, the personnel policies of 
the Republic of Vietnam exacerbated the problem. Krepinevich writes: 
The RVN mobilization law gave the ARVN the cream of the nation's 
manpower, leaving recruits of marginal ability available for recruitment by 
police. Pay was low compared with that received by members of the 
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ARVN performing in comparable positions of responsibility. The effect of 
these personnel policies was a police force of marginal quality at best. 
(Krepinevich, 1986: p. 228) 
If MACV recognized that the war in Vietnam was a popular one in its guerilla phase its 
allocation of resources did not indicate this. 
General Abrams' LRPTG noted both the nature of the war and the capacity of the 
North Vietnamese to continue a guerilla struggle for the foreseeable future. Their report 
states, "Recent statements by NVNs leaders make clear their adherence to the basic 
principles of protracted war: continued struggle despite temporary reverses, the shift from 
the offensive to the defensive as necessary, and the shift from primacy of military action to 
the primacy of political action." (LRPTG, 1969: p. 4) MACV failed to appreciate this 
capability and continued to escalate the conventional war by increasing South Vietnamese 
participation in it while reducing the efforts to secure the countryside. Its approach to the 
pacification effort was, at best, ambivalent and sought success in that area only as a means 
to free up more South Vietnamese forces to conduct the conventional war. Krepinevich 
writes of MACVs attitude toward an early attempt at pacification, the Strategic Hamlets 
program, "MACVs position was to support the Strategic Hamlets program, provided ft 
did not interfere with the broader role MACV had set for the ARVN - conducting 
offensive operations designed to destroy VC forces." (Krepinevich, 1986: p. 69) 
MACV, therefore, foiled to recognize the dynamics of the Vietnam War and its inherently 
popular nature. As a result, the operational plans issued by that headquarters did not 
address the main threat facing the Republic of South Vietnam: the lack of credible, 







The reduction of war to a finite set of variables should make a predictive and 
positive doctrine possible for warfare. This is not the case, however, due to the large 
number of combinations and permutations of these variables in their varying quantities. 
This prompted Clausewitz to write, "Bonaparte rightly said in this connection that many of 
the decisions faced by the commander-in-chief resemble mathematical problems worthy of 
thegiftsofaiVeH'tonoran£«fe/'." (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 112) It is this phenomenon that 
describes the next aspect of chaos theory addressed herein, nonlinearity. 
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IV. THE FRENETIC FEEDBACK OF NONLINEARITY 
A. CHAOS, CLAUSEWITZ, AND NONLINEARITY IN WAR 
The next trait of chaotic systems in Kellert's definition is nonlinearity. Physical 
nonlinear systems are those whose equations do not remain constant as the system evolves 
and, as a result, do not produce proportionate outcomes. James Gleick, author of Chaos: 
The Making of a New Science, describes nonlinearity using friction, a physical nonlinear 
system: 
"Nonlinearity means that the act of playing the game has a way of changing 
the rules. You cannot assign a constant importance to friction, because its 
importance depends on speed. Speed, in turn, depends on friction. That 
twisted changeability makes nonlinearity hard to calculate, but it also 
creates rich kinds of behavior that never occur in linear systems. (Gleick, 
1987: p.24)4 
In this case Gleick uses friction as an example of nonlinearity: it is a function of how fast 
the object is travelling yet the speed of the object is, in part, a function of the amount of 
friction that is operating on it. On a philosophical level, this means that the relationships 
between the components of a dynamical system do not remain fixed but change as the 
system changes over time. In war, for example, the relationship between the strength of 
the defense versus the attack can change as it interacts with the morale of the two sides 
involved or that greater increments of firepower do not necessarily translate into greater 
prospects for victory. 
'Friction occupies a central place in On War, although Clausewitz's use of the word transcends the 
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Clausewitz identifies several interactions in war besides those in the trinity, all of 
which are nonlinear and support the accuracy of chaos theory as a metaphor for his ideas 
in On War. David Ruelle notes that, "... for sensitive dependence on initial conditions to 
occur, at least three oscillators are necessary. In addition, the more oscillators there are, 
and the more coupling there is between them, the more likely you are to see chaos." 
(Ruelle, 1991: p. 81) Clausewitz identifies at least four interacting components, or 
oscillators, in Book One of On War.   These are: the opposing sides in a conflict, the ends 
and means of each side, the aforementioned trinity of the people, armed forces, and 
policies of a state, and the phenomenon he labels friction and its antithesis, the genius of 
the commander. These interacting parts are nonlinear and satisfy, at least philosophically, 
both Kellert and Ruelle's definitions for chaotic systems. 
B. THE NONLINEARITY OF OPPOSING SIDES IN WAR 
The first nonlinear relationship addressed by Clausewitz in On War is that of the 
opposing sides. He writes: 
War, however, is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass (total 
nonresistance would be no war at all) but always the collision of two living 
forces. The ultimate aim of waging war, as formulated here, must be taken 
as applying to both sides. Once again, there is interaction. So long as I 
have not overthrown my opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow 
me. Thus I am not in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to 
him. (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 77) 
The interactive nature of the opposing sides employing violence to attain mutually 
exclusive goals makes the result of this interaction out of proportion to its sum: a 
nonlinear relationship. David Nichols and Todor Tagarev comment on the implications of 
this interrelationship in an article entitled, "What Does Chaos Theory Mean for Warfare," 
46 
 
      
r.  .  









"If warfare is chaotic, then chaos theory warns us that enemy systems can exist in different 
states. The implications are that we must be aware of these possible states and, if 
necessary, be capable of changing our own system's state to counter the enemy's 
strategy." (Nichols and Tagarev, 1994: p. 57) Clausewitz recognizes this aspect of war 
and addresses it in his theory, thus philosophically satisfying the requirement for chaotic 
systems that their interactions demonstrate nonlinearity. 
The nonlinear interaction of opposites reveals itself in two distinct manifestations 
in popular and conventional war. This section contrasts the two from the perspective of 
an external power intervening in a regional conflict. John Shy approaches the differences 
in the two types of conflict by characterizing conventional war as a "Western" 
phenomenon and revolutionary war as "Maoist." He writes: 
In the Western tradition, epitomized by Napoleon, military victory was to 
be achieved quickly, and the seizure or defense of territory was central to 
the very purpose of warfare. For Mao, long without the means either to 
seize and hold territory or to win quick victory, space and time became 
weapons rather than goals. "Protracted struggle" promised to exhaust the 
enemy, if not militarily then at least politically, as he failed to achieve the 
quick victory demanded by the Western tradition. (Paret, 1986: p. 839) 
In conventional war, as well as the final stage of a popular war, the opposition uses armed 
force composed of large, concentrated units organized along functional lines and operating 
under centralized command and control. These units use massive physical force and 
concentrate in space and time to occupy terrain and inflict military defeat on their 
adversary. The opposing force may or may not seek total defeat of its adversaries and will 
offer varying levels or resistance. The Gulf War is an excellent example of a conventional 
adversary from the Unites States' viewpoint: Iraq deployed a large, conventional military 
47 
r  is ti , t   t r   t  t   t i  t 
t t .  i i ti  r  t t  t     t t  , i
,   i   '  '  
t t .  l   ,  57   






ay    ill 
 lf   t
i ' i  l  l , ti l ilit
force and was defeated by more of the same, with most of the nonlinearity part of the 
interaction being visited upon Iraq's armed forces. 
In popular war, in contrast, the opposition employs small, diffused forces 
organized in tandem with the region they are operating in and under decentralized 
command and control. They use limited force targeted at a specific audience and 
concentrate on the political and psychological areas of the human terrain to inflict political 
defeat on the external power and its protege' government. Once this is done, the transition 
to conventional war occurs, and the goals of the insurgents are total, which often produces 
an asymmetry of motivation that favors them. The war in Vietnam is a good example of 
this interaction because the Viet Cong operated in this manner except for the more 
conventional Tet Offensive. After their defeat in 1968 the Communists returned to 
guerilla warfare until the North Vietnamese conventional invasion made them irrelevant. 
Further, the Viet Cong's total goals contrasted with those of the United States, which bore 
the brunt of this political defeat's nonlinearity. 
The nonlinear interaction of opposing sides in each type of conflict has implications 
for the success or failure of an external power such as the United States. In a 
conventional war, the nature of the adversary places a premium on ensuring the outright 
military defeat of his armed forces and erosion of his will to resist. Concentration in time 
and space are crucial and superior firepower, if applied effectively, rules the day. The host 
government, if any, plays a limited role if the intervener has most of the military power and 
the willingness to use it. In a popular war, however, the dominant role of the population 
in the conflict means that concentration on the human terrain is paramount. The host 
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government is vital to this from the external sponsor's viewpoint because it possesses the 
means by which the intervener can win the political battle. Firepower takes a back seat, 
particularly in the populated areas that the insurgents' infrastructure operates, because 
application of firepower in populated areas contributes to losing the political battle. The 
nonlinear nature of the opponents' interaction exacerbates the effects of fighting the 
opponent in a manner that fails to recognize whether the war is of the conventional or 
internal variety. 
The interaction of the United States with its communist enemies, the Viet Cong 
and North Vietnamese during the peak years of direct participation by United States 
ground forces was one that possessed the characteristics of a popular war. The 
communists maintained a focus on the population and sought to destabilize the political 
situation of the Republic of South Vietnam rather than the outright defeat of the United 
States and its host. Andrew Krepinevich describes the communists' activities: 
While the [US] Army chased its elusive quarry through the country's 
interior the insurgents continued operating along the densely populated 
Coastal Plains. Over half of all significant contact with Communist forces 
in the first half of 1966 took place, not in the interior regions, but along the 
Coastal Plains. The inference was clear: the insurgents would fight to 
maintain access to the population while leading the Army on a wild goose 
chase inland, drawing MACVs maneuver battalions away from the people 
they were purportedly protecting. (Krepinevich, 1986: p. 180) 
The Viet Cong, and later the North Vietnamese, thus used their larger units to draw the 
United States' combat power away from the critical areas of the conflict so that the 
communist infrastructure could maintain effective control of the population. 
Adding an additional layer of complexity to the interaction of belligerents was the 
relationship between the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. This relationship was not 
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simply a sponsor - client one, with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam using the Viet 
Cong as partisans. Rather, the Viet Cong were an independent movement supported to 
varying degrees by the North Vietnamese until the latter successfully captured their 
movement after the ill - fated Tet Offensive. The Viet Cong's relationship to the North 
Vietnamese, never an entirely friendly one due to ethnic and linguistic differences between 
the two, became one of competition. Larry Cable writes in his book, Unholy Grail: 
By late 1966 the North Vietnamese had changed their relationship 
to the Southern guerrillas. After acting as an external sponsoring power 
for some twelve to eighteen months, North Vietnam was in pursuit of its 
own goals by fall 1966. This meant that the Viet Cong had become 
expendable. The North Vietnamese theory of victory sought success 
through the enervation of the American and South Vietnamese political 
will. To the extent that the Americans killed Viet Cong, Hanoi was 
winning. To the extent that the war was protracted and made inconclusive, 
Hanoi was winning. (Cable, 1991: p. 239) 
Despite the takeover of the insurgency by the North Vietnamese after 1968, the war 
remained a popular one focused on the human terrain of the population rather than a 
conventional one bent on the destruction of the United States and South Vietnamese 
armed forces. 
The United States and South Vietnamese, for their part of the interaction, added to 
the nonhnearity by attempting to fight a popular war in a conventional way. The Viet 
Cong - North Vietnamese competition was a weakness that a more politically oriented 
campaign could have seized upon as a way to wrest control of the population from the 
communists, yet the United States continued to focus its efforts on the destruction of main 
force units. In 1969 General Abrams' LRPTG concluded, in part, that: 
All of our US combat accomplishments have made no significant, positive 
difference to the rural Vietnamese - for there is still no real security in the 
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countryside. Our large - scale operations have attempted to enable the 
development of a protective shield, by driving the NVA and the Viet Cong 
main force units out of South Vietnam - or at least into the remote 
mountain and jungle areas where they would not pose a threat to the 
population. In pressing this objective, however, we have tended to lose 
sight of why we were driving the enemy back and destroying his combat 
capability. Destruction of NVA and VC units and individuals - that is, the 
"kill VC" syndrome - has become an end in itself- an end that at times has 
become self- defeating. To accomplish the more difficult task of the war - 
and, really the functional reason for the US to he here - that of providing 
security to the Vietnamese people - we have relied on numerous, but only 
marginally effective, ill - equipped and indifferently led Vietnamese 
paramilitary and police units. The Viet Cong thrive in an environment of 
insecurity. It is essential for them to demonstrate that the GVN is not 
capable of providing security to its citizens. And, they have succeeded. 
(LRPTG, 1969: p. 20) 
Thus the United States felt the impact of the nonlinearity of the interaction between 
belligerents because it failed to identify the nature of the conflict and take the initiative 
from the communists by focusing on the population's security rather than on the enemy's 
armed forces. 
The interaction of the opponents in a popular war, characterized by political 
struggle over the human terrain of South Vietnam's coastal plains, demanded a response 
by MACV that appreciated the nature of the war. Campaign plans issued by that 
headquarters had to emphasize local security in these areas and deploy adequate troops to 
engage in population control operations. These operations required a major role for host 
nation forces, permanent presence of government forces at the hamlet level, and 
elimination of communist cadres and cell organizations, whether they be of indigenous or 
North Vietnamese origins. In terms of the interaction of belligerents MACV had the 
specific task of identifying and targeting the most dangerous and likely threat to the 
security of the population. 
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MACV failed to identify the most critical threat to the population's security in its 
combined campaign plans throughout the time of direct involvement by United States' 
forces in the Vietnam War. All of the reports, from 1966 to 1971, made the overt 
assumption that Democratic Republic of Vietnam was exercising "... command direction 
of the VC." (MACV, 1966: p. 152; 1967: p. 4; 1968 -1971: p. 2) While this was 
increasingly true after the 1968 Tet Offensive, it was not the case prior to that. That 
assumption, particularly early in the war, fulfilled the motivated bias of MACV that the 
war was a conventional one against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam rather than a 
popular war waged by the Viet Cong. 
The intelligence annexes to MAC Vs combined campaign plans are also indicative 
of this bias. The 1966 plan states, "The overall goal of the DRV Lao Dong party is the 
political and military conquest of the RVN." (MACV, 1966: p. 166) It then discusses the 
activities and locations of various Viet Cong and People's Army of Vietnam units with 
particular attention paid to regimental size units and making only one mention of Viet 
Cong cadre strength. (MACV, 1966: pp. 166-170) The annex concludes with a list of 
enemy capabilities that focus on the military capacity of the Viet Cong to attack targets 
inside the Republic of Vietnam and a map depicting the probable locations of main force 
units of regimental size. (MACV, 1966: pp. 171-173) Conspicuous by its absence is any 
discussion of the Viet Cong's political or psychological warfare activities or capabilities, 
nor any discussion of the role of the VCI in the war. 
The 1967 and 1968 combined campaign plans also view the enemy through the 
conventional paradigm. In addition to focusing on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as 
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the main enemy, the 1967 plan goes on to describe the nature of the enemy's probable 
strategy: 
Enemy composition and disposition of forces indicate that the 
enemy considers the main battle area to be in Military Region 5 (the central 
highlands), in view of the important military, political, and economic 
objectives therein. Its mountains and heavy jungle, and the close proximity 
to LAOS, CAMBODIA, and NVN make this battle area more favorable to 
the movement, security, and re-supply of his forces. In this concept, the 
enemy would create a holding area between the highlands and the delta and 
maintain sufficient forces in this holding area to pose a sufficient threat to 
prevent GVN and Allied Forces from reinforcing the main battle area. 
(MACV, 1967: p. A-5) 
Again, MACV focused on the conventional aspects of concentration in time and space to 
defeat a military opponent rather than on the population and the political objectives of the 
Viet Cong and Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The goal of occupying the central 
highlands was not to establish an area from which to operate on interior lines, but to draw 
resources away from the real main battle area, which was the coastal plains and Mekong 
Delta regions. 
The 1969 plan marked a transition in MACVs assessment of enemy intentions and 
rightly identified the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as the command entity for the war 
in South Vietnam. In this case the plan overtly mentions the protracted war strategy of 
the communists and correctly describes their strategy in 1969: 
Realizing that he cannot win a military victory, the enemy is currently 
resorting to a "fighting while negotiating" stratagem. Apparently he hopes 
that continuing offensive action in the Republic of Vietnam can win him a 
diplomatic advantage at the conference table. Despite significant casualties 
suffered already, the enemy is expected to renew his costly efforts to 
expand his control of the rural areas, which he views as his springboard for 
further, widespread subversive action. (MACV, 1969: p. A-2) 
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This is as close as MACV got to identifying the most serious threat feeing the United 
States and the Republic of Vietnam. 
Later campaign plans, for 1970 and 1971, continue to place emphasis on the "fight 
while talking" strategy, although they mistakenly assume that the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam would settle for a compromise solution that established a neutral South Vietnam 
with a coalition government that had Viet Cong participation in it. (MACV, 1970: p. A- 
9) Further, the annexes in these years insist that the enemy's greatest weaknesses are 
vulnerability to air, artillery, and naval gunfire; spoiling attacks; and interdiction of lines of 
communication. (MACV, 1970: p. A-26) These passages indicate a continued bias 
toward seeing the enemy in conventional terms: a state - the DRV - pursuing limited aims 
- a coalition government in South Vietnam - via coercive diplomacy. The actual case was 
a state sponsoring an insurgency for the revolutionary purposes of seizing political power 
from the current regime. 
MACVs inability to identify the main threat in the first years of its involvement 
and later to accurately assess the intentions of its adversary hampered its ability to 
coordinate its efforts with the Republic of Vietnam's Pacification and Development Plan. 
This plan called for the forces supporting South Vietnam to "... vigorously push our 
attacks into the communist based areas and exploit their weakness to eliminate them 
completely from pacified areas, and thus create an advantageous milieu so we can increase 
the quality of life in the future." (RVN, 1970: p. 1) The attacks the pacification plan 
mentions were to occur in Viet Cong infested areas and the weakness that it alludes to 
refers to the significant losses suffered by the VCI in the wake of the Tet Offensive and 
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success of the Phoenix program. MACVs campaign plans, however, generally visualized 
the enemy in a conventional way and targeted the main forces operating far away from the 
critical populated areas. 
Combat after - action reports almost invariably listed main force units in their 
intelligence paragraphs, which is another symptom of MACVs focus on the conventional 
enemy rather than the popular oriented one. One example of this phenomenon is the 
report submitted by a battalion of the United States 101st Airborne Division in 1970 
which listed the 4th NVA Regiment and its constituent elements as its adversary in 
Operation Jefferson Glenn. (2/327th Inf, 101st, 1970: p. 12) It discussed the capabilities 
of the enemy unit but made no mention of the political situation in the region or the 
activities of the VCI. This report is typical of the trend of United States forces to identify 
the conventional units operating in an area while ignoring the political activities of the 
main threat. 
General Abrams' LRPTG report correctly assessed the threat facing the Republic 
of Vietnam and the impact of the United States' inability to counter it. It states: 
It is noi an understatement to say that the GVN and its officials have 
misgivings about the current situation. They are rightly worried about the 
situation in the countryside, despite our success in the "war of the 
battalions." They know that the VC infrastructure is formidable, and that 
as long as it remains in being it can always regenerate a military threat, as 
well as be a constant subversive force. (LRPTG, 1969: p. 9) 
South Vietnam had plenty of reason to worry as MACVs campaign plans demonstrate. 
The inability of MACV to correctly identify the main threat facing the Republic of 
Vietnam until late in the war, as the United States began to end its involvement, left South 
Vietnam confronting an ongoing insurgency coupled with a major conventional threat. 
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James J. Wirtz describes the intelligence analysis conducted at the time: 
U.S. intelligence analysts focused on the military aspects of people's war, 
even though they recognized that an unsophisticated application of this 
framework could lead to oversimplified analysis. As the war progressed, 
analysts who followed the communist debate over strategy realized that 
each of the three phases of a people's war embodied a degree of flexibility 
of tactics, forces, and objectives. (Wirtz, 1991: p. 103) 
This flexibility kept the communists one step ahead of MACV, which focused on one 
aspect of one phase, and illustrates the difficulty in coping with the nonlinear interaction of 
belligerents in a popular war such as the one in Vietnam. 
C. THE NONLENEARITY OF ENDS AND MEANS IN WAR 
The next nonlinear interaction explained by Clausewitz in On War is that of the 
political ends and military means employed by the two opposing sides. He devotes the 
entire second chapter of Book One to this relationship, which exhibits the traits of 
nonlinearity.5 In it he writes: 
As we saw in the first chapter, war, if taken as a whole, is bound to move 
from the strict law of inherent necessity toward probabilities. The more the 
circumstances that gave rise to the conflict cause it to do so, the slighter 
will be its motives and the tensions which it occasions.   And this makes it 
understandable how an analysis of probabilities may lead to peace itself. 
Not every war need be fought until one side collapses. When the motives 
and tensions of war are slight we can imagine that the very faintest 
prospect of defeat might be enough to cause one side to yield. If from the 
very start the other side feels that this is probable, it will obviously 
concentrate on bringing about this probability rather than take the long 
way round and totally defeat the enemy. (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 91) 
The dynamic nature of the relationship between ends and means in war produces the wide 
'Clausewitz indicated in a note dated 10 Jufy 1827 that he intended to revise the entire work 
based on this interaction. Unfortunately, his untimely death in 1831 prevented any further revision 
of On War. 
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but finite of number possible outcomes of the conflict. Beyerchen comments on 
Clausewitz's description of this interaction: 
The ends - means relationship clearly does not work in a linear fashion. 
The constant interplay is an interactive, feedback process that constitutes 
an intrinsic feature of war. Clausewitz's conception is that the conduct of 
any war affects its character, and its altered character feeds back into the 
political ends that guide its conduct. War is, he says, a "true chameleon" 
that exhibits a different nature in every concrete instance. (Beyerchen, 
1993: p. 68) 
This relationship, then, is another example of Clausewitz's recognition of war's 
nonlinearity and becomes part of a larger chaotic system as it interacts with the other 
components of war. 
The nonlinear relationship between the political goals and operational means also 
points out differences in the two types of war. Conventional war is characterized by 
centralized control by the state over the means at its disposal in pursuit of goals that may 
or may not involve total defeat of the enemy. This holds true for both opponents in the 
conflict, which limits the amount of feedback from the ends - means interaction because 
both sides seek a military victory to impose their will on the situation. Thus, the link 
between the military means and political ends is clear and military activity occurs as an 
extension of policy, not policy itself  Returning to the example of the Gulf War, the 
United States' goal of driving Iraq from Kuwait was not changed even when the 
magnitude of Iraq's defeat became apparent. In other words, the major defeat of Hussein's 
forces did not change the character of the war because the ends had been achieved and 
were inextricably linked to their means. 
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Popular war, in contrast, exhibits major feedback for the external power because it 
faces a politically oriented opponent that seeks total aims and has no overt military force 
to concentrate on. Mao Tse Tung comments on the political nature of the insurgent force, 
in this case the Chinese Red Army: 
Especially at the present time, certainly the Red Army exists not merely to 
fight; besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should 
also shoulder such important tasks as agitating the masses, organizing 
them, arming them, and helping them to set up revolutionary political 
power, and even establishing organizations of the Communist Party. When 
the Red Army fights, it fights not merely for the sake of fighting but to 
agitate the masses, to organize them, to arm them, and to help them 
establish revolutionary political power; apart from such objectives, fighting 
loses its meaning and the Red Army the meaning for its existence. 
(Pomeroy, 1968: p. 175) 
The insurgents' political focus on total aims - revolutionary political power - and 
connection to the population produces two effects: an asymmetry of motivation that 
favors the insurgents and a blurring of lines between ends and means. The latter 
phenomenon increases the feedback in this nonlinear interaction because every action has 
direct political ramifications, the means have, in effect, become policy in a very direct way. 
In Vietnam, for example, the routine application of massive firepower by United States' 
forces to defeat guerrillas had the immediate political effect of estranging the population 
from the host government and its external sponsor. 
The variations of the ends - means interaction discussed above pose very different 
problems for an external power. In a conventional war, the intervener must develop clear 
political goals and ensure that it has the military capability to carry them out. An 
important step in this process is determining the relative motivation of the adversary and 
his military capabilities. Once this is done the armed forces may prosecute the war in 
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accordance with the bounds established by policy. In popular war, however, identification 
of the ends and means is not enough. The nonlinear relationship between them places a 
premium on restraint because military activity directly and immediately influences the 
political goals, and the inherent asymmetry of motivation makes defeat of insurgency a 
daunting task if undertaken in a conventional manner. 
The relationship between ends and means in the Vietnam War from the United 
States' perspective indicates that it was a popular war. The United States' goals, rooted in 
the larger Cold War, were to contain the expansion of communism. The war in Vietnam, 
therefore, was not one of survival on its part. Further, the United States was not pursuing 
the positive goal of unifying Vietnam by invading the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; 
but it was pursuing the negative goal of defending the Republic of Vietnam from internal 
and external aggression. The Viet Cong, on the other hand, were fighting for their very 
survival and sought the destruction of the Republic of Vietnam, which was also the goal of 
the North Vietnamese. This, combined with the Republic of Vietnam's struggle for 
survival, gave the United States the weakest reason for involvement and the most 
restrictive goals. Larry Cable writes: 
South Vietnam, the Viet Cong/National Liberation Front, and North 
Vietnam were the primary parties to the conflict; their definitions of victory 
or defeat and their goals served to constrain the freedom of the United 
States to impose its own schemata with any legitimate expectation of 
success. The Johnson Administration was obliged to recognize that the 
multi - party conflict in which it was immersing the United States arose 
from cultural, social, economic, and political factors which were 
endogenous to the region and governed by regional historical trajectories. 
This recognition must not simply be a matter of rhetorical genuflection; it 
must be acted upon as a central factor in policy formulation and execution. 




The nature of popular war, and the Vietnam War in particular, created a major potential 
for feedback for the United States due to the asymmetry of motivation facing the external 
power. Thus the relationship between ends and means in Vietnam for the United States 
was very close and produced nonlinear effects. 
Successful operational planning in Vietnam required an active recognition of the 
asymmetry of motivation and the immediate and magnified interaction of ends and means 
in the theater of operations. MACVs challenge was to apply enough force to eliminate 
the communists' political infrastructure within South Vietnam and isolate their main force 
units while providing security for the population and building confidence in the Republic 
of Vietnam's regime. Indiscriminate use of force, harsh treatment of the population, and 
overreliance on United States forces rather than those of South Vietnam would have 
immediate and negative consequences both in the theater of operations and in the United 
States. The line between force and restraint was a very thin one in Vietnam, and this 
required close scrutiny, clear guidance, and careful planning on the part of MACV. 
MACV failed to adequately shield the population from the effects of indiscriminate 
violence associated with military operations in inhabited areas. Part of the reason for this 
is the lack of emphasis on rules of engagement designed to limit collateral damage and the 
liberal nature of these rules. None of the combined campaign plans mentions any rules of 
engagement or guidance on the use of force in the main text of the document. Discussion 
of rules of engagement is relegated to an annex that directs how South Vietnamese and 
United States forces would coordinate their actions. The lack of guidance on application 
of force in populated areas shows an almost complete disregard for the security of the 
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population and the feedback effects of indiscriminate violence on the political atmosphere 
in the Republic of Vietnam. 
If MACV had deemed the rules of engagement worthy of inclusion in the main 
body of its campaign plan, there is no guarantee that the population would have been any 
more secure because the guidance itself left ample room for diverging interpretations and 
misuse. The 1966 and 1967 plans offer identical guidance on the employment of massive 
firepower in hamlets: 
Artillery fire, naval gunfire, and air strikes in RVN against known or 
suspected VC targets in hamlets and villages occupied by noncombatants 
are governed by the following: 
(1) All attacks will be controlled by an airborne or ground FAC, ground 
observer or RVNAF observer and will be executed only after US-GVN- 
RVNAF approval, as appropriate. 
(2) Hamlets and villages not associated with ground operations will not be 
attacked without prior warning (by leaflets and/or speaker systems or other 
appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them. 
(3) Hamlets and villages may be attacked without prior warning if the 
attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of 
ground forces through the area, and if, in the judgement of the ground 
commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning. (MACV, 
1966: p. 185; 1967: p. 1-6) 
Given the natural and understandable reluctance of commanders to sustain unnecessary 
casualties clearing a hamlet with ground troops, indirect fire or air strikes more often than 
not were needed to avoid "jeopardizing the mission." Further, getting permission from 
one's higher headquarters to employ these means was relatively simple, and the prior 
warning accorded the citizens of a targeted hamlet did little to compensate them for the 
damage and harassment of becoming refugees and having their homes destroyed. The 
1968 and 1969 plans contain the same basic guidance, with the concomitant results of 
continued feedback of the means employed into the ends sought. 
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The 1970 and 1971 combined campaign plans also neglect to mention any 
guidance on the application offeree in populated areas in the main body of the plan. In 
the coordination annexes the plans do not spell out the rules of engagement but do 
reference a MACV directive that clarifies the use offeree in hamlets and villages. Again, 
the rules of engagement are not given the emphasis they deserve in a popular war, and the 
indiscriminate application of massive firepower continued with the predictable effect of 
worsening the political situation in the Republic of Vietnam by alienating the peasants 
whose support the government was trying to gain. 
MACVs combined campaign plans again contrasted with the Republic of 
Vietnam's Pacification and Development Plan, which governed the effort to provide 
security for the population in South Vietnam. The 1970 plan identifies zones of action in 
which different activities were to occur. The least secure zones, clearing zones, were 
those areas dominated by the Viet Cong and in which main force units routinely operated. 
Regular forces were operate in these zones to eliminate or remove the main force presence 
so that pacification efforts could begin. Even in these zones, which had the heaviest 
enemy presence, the plan sought to limit the impact of military operations on the 
population. It states: 
Clearing Zones. Operations in this zone concentrate on VC/NVA main 
forces to prevent their intruding into consolidation zones. Rules of 
engagement for the clearing zone must emphasize that civilians are not 
unnecessarily exposed to friendly fires. The objective is to separate the 
population from the enemy in order to facilitate establishment of effective 
security. (RVN, 1970: p. 1-1-5) 
MACVs failure to stress the importance of protecting the population from friendly fire via 
rules of engagement or other guidance on the application offeree contradicted the goals 
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of the pacification and development plans, which addressed the most important aspect of a 
popular war security of the population. 
Combat after - action reports make note of the problems associated with 
operations in inhabited areas and express frustration over the enemy's habit of using 
villages and hamlets as hiding places and cache locations. The United States 1st Cavalry 
Division report of the Pleiku Campaign in 1965 notes: 
Search and destroy operations where the enemy and innocent civilians are 
intermingled continues to present problems. If an operation is imminent, 
women and children normally will hide in holes for protection against 
artillery and small arms. In areas where it is suspected that innocent 
personnel are involved, a recommended solution is to have Vietnamese 
interpreters call into holes before clearing them. (1st CAV, 1965: p. 130) 
The normal method of clearing holes and trenches was to throw fragmentation grenades in 
them, which added to the casualties suffered by civilians who hid in them to escape 
artillery and air strikes. The Viet Cong knew the political and psychological impact that 
indiscriminate violence had on the population and located its units accordingly. Further, 
the apparent weakness stemming from the communists' lack of heavy firepower was a 
political strength because they did not suffer from the same feedback effects that the 
United States and Republic of Vietnam did. MACVs inability to address the impact of its 
means on the ends it was seeking further hindered the United States' war effort. 
General Abrams' LRPTG made note of the impact of United States military 
operations in Vietnam, characterizing them as "... major agents of social change in South 
Vietnam." (LRPTG, 1969: p. 23) The lack of effective rules of engagement or concrete 
guidance on the use of force in populated areas was one such agent. Eric Bergerud 
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Yet, even if rigidly adhered to, the regulations permitted the use of huge 
amounts of firepower. And, as events would show, the South Vietnamese 
rarely objected to the American commanders' choices of weaponry. This is 
hardly surprising for ARVN was, if anything, quicker to utilize whatever 
support was available than were U.S. units. Furthermore, the ROE were 
not always understood properly by American officers; they were also 
frequently ignored. Lastly, the ROE were bitterly resented by many 
combat officers who sincerely believed that they increased American 
casualties. (Bergerud, 1991: p. 88) 
Thus the combined campaign plans issued by MAC V contributed to the problem of 
nonlinear feedback of military means into the political ends characteristic of popular wars 
by failing to protect the population with clear and robust rules of engagement. 
D. NONL1NEAMTY AND THE TRINITARIAN VIEW OF WAR 
The third nonlinear interaction is one also addressed in the discussion of 
Clausewitz's overall conception of war: the Trinity of the people, armed forces, and 
policies of a state. This metaphor describes the character of each of the belligerents in 
war, and represents one of the four interacting parts of the whole. He writes of the 
Trinity: 
War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to 
the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always 
make war a paradoxical trinity - composed of primordial violence, hatred, 
and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of 
chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and 
of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it 
subject to reason alone. (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 89) 
He goes on to assert that one cannot fix arbitrary relationships between the components of 
the trinity. The emphasis of this passage on the dynamic nature of the relationship 
between the elements is a clear indication of its nonlinearity. Beyerchen writes: 
"Although the passage is usually taken to mean only that we should not overemphasize 
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any one element in the Trinity, Clausewitz's metaphor also implicitly confronts us with the 
chaos inherent in a nonlinear system sensitive to initial conditions." (Beyerchen, 1993: 
p. 69) Thus Clausewitz's Trinity represents yet another nonlinear interaction in war that, 
in turn, interacts with the other components of the dynamical system that produces a 
semblance of a chaotic system. 
The interaction of the components of the Trinity determines the nature of the 
belligerents and differs according to the type of war being fought. In a conventional war, 
the state and population "magnets" interact to generate military power. The more war 
approaches its total form, the more the state must mobilize society, and the intensity of the 
bond between these components varies with the intensity of the goals pursued by the state. 
Thus conventional wars exhibit the centrality of military power and the importance of a 
state's capital as critical components. The Gulf War illustrates this: The United States' 
preponderance of military power after Operation Desert Storm allowed it to end that 
conflict and conclude a peace on its terms. 
Popular war, on the other hand, exhibits the primacy of political power and the 
criticality of the human terrain as the "people" leg of the Trinity interacts with that of the 
state or counterstate during the first two phases of the conflict. The totality of the 
insurgents' goals and the difficulty of an external power to influence the population makes 
competing in this political realm difficult, unless the host government enjoys effective 
control over the population. The battle is, quite literally, over the hearts and minds of the 
people and this places the role of the military in a subordinate role to that of the state - 




aspects of the conflict and lost because its activities were disconnected from the 
population and were, in some cases inimicable to it. The Viet Cong, in contrast, 
successfully maintained their ties to the population and persevered in spite of military 
defeats. 
Clausewitz identifies the critical product of the interaction of the Trinity: the 
center of gravity. He writes, "Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity 
develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the 
point against which all our energies should be directed." (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 595) This 
center of gravity is different for the two types of war and the intervening power must 
know the difference in order to successfully prosecute the war. In conventional war, the 
primary product of the Trinity, military power, creates this center of gravity. To subdue 
them one must either defeat the opponent's armed forces or occupy enough strategic 
terrain to cause him to submit. In popular war, however, the center of gravity arises from 
the political connection between the population and the state or insurgents, depending on 
the viewpoint. This center of gravity is the link between the insurgents and the population 
and is manifest in the organization's infrastructure, and an external power must target this 
link without alienating the population from the host government. 
Correct assessment of the product of the Trinity's interaction, the center of gravity, 
is a critical task for an intervening power because it determines the appropriate policy 
response. In a conventional setting, a response that relies primarily on military power is 
efficacious because it counters the enemy's center of gravity: its military power. 
Destruction of this power renders the state and its population vulnerable and will produce 
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a peace settlement unless the war changes into an internal war.   In a popular war, 
however, the insurgents' center of gravity demands a different response. Nathan Leites 
and Charles Wolf describe the infrastructure of an insurgency as a production system that 
transforms popular support into material and political power and, as such, represents the 
center of gravity of an internal war. They write: 
Counter-insurgency is primarily a counterproduction effort, rather than an 
effort to annihilate forces or acquire territory. The aim of successful 
counterinsurgency is to counter R[ebellion]'s ability to produce and 
reproduce forces as well as "harden" the structure of government authority 
so it can withstand R's attack while the essential counterproduction effort is 
gaining momentum. (Leites and Wolf, 1970: p. 84) 
This counterproduction effort attempts to separate the insurgents' infrastructure from its 
resource base, the population, and then to destroy it. As a result, it more closely 
resembles a police operation than a military operation because of the requirement to 
identify the insurgents then to use restraint in eliminating them to prevent damage to the 
population at large. 
In Vietnam, the Untied States faced an opponent whose center of gravity resided 
in the link between itself and the population: an entity known then and now as the Viet 
Cong Infrastructure (VCI). The dominance of this link rather than the one between the 
PAVN and main force Viet Cong units and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam indicates 
that the Vietnam War was of the popular variety. Dale Andrade', author of Ashes to 
Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War, writes in his preface: 
In fact, the VCI provided the central figures in the communists' strategy in 
South Vietnam. They carried out Mao Tse-tung's dictum that 
revolutionaries should be like fish swimming in the sea of the people. The 
VCI - not the North Vietnamese Army or the Viet Cong military units - 
were the fish. They were the men and women who used every possible 
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means to assure that communist ideology took hold in the countryside and 
that the Saigon government was discredited in the eyes of the people. 
(Andrade', 1990: p. x) 
The fact that the communists maintained the initiative during the course of the war makes 
this center of gravity all the more important and cements the idea of the Vietnam War as 
an internal one. 
The task before MACV was the proper identification and subsequent targeting of 
the enemy's center of gravity and the preservation of its own. Successfully targeting the 
VCI must more closely resemble a police operation than conventional combat, because the 
VCI was integrated into the population and a massive assault on the latter would only 
estrange it and exacerbate the situation. MACVs center of gravity resided in its most 
precious resource, political will in the United States. Operational planning, therefore, had 
to focus on the VCTs destruction while preserving the political will of the United States to 
continue the war. Massive collateral damage, large casualties on the part of United States 
ground forces, and demonstrations of strength by the communists such as the Tet 
Offensive would all be inimicable to MACVs mission. 
MACV increasingly recognized the importance of the VCI as the years of direct 
United States involvement continued, but it never gave the VCI the central place it 
deserved as the communists' center of gravity. Rather, MACVs operational plans located 
the enemy's center of gravity in the Viet Cong and PAVN main forces operating in the 
central highlands. The 1966 plan makes no mention of the VCI at all in its text, and lists it 
only as a statistic in the intelligence annex with no analysis of its activities or capabilities. 
(MACV, 1966: p. 168) At the beginning of direct United States involvement in the war, 
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then, MACV largely ignored the neutralization of the VCI, preferring to leave this task to 
civilian agencies or the Republic of Vietnam. 
The 1967 combined campaign plan shows an increased awareness of the VCI's role 
but stops well short of identifying it as the main opponent. The plan states, "Throughout 
this campaign increased emphasis will be given to identifying and eliminating the VC 
infrastructure and to small unit operations designed specifically to destroy the guerrilla 
force." (MACV, 1967: p. 4) The rest of the plan, however, fails to address the VCI in a 
meaningful way: the intelligence annex mentions it only in passing and assumes that the 
communists are attempting to gain strategic mobility by introducing main force units into 
the central highlands. (MACV, 1967: p. A-2) The focus of the plan is clearly on the 
large unit war, not the political struggle being waged by the VCI in the coastal plains and 
Mekong Delta. 
The 1968 and 1969 campaign plans give even more attention to the VCI, devoting 
an entire annex to operations designed to eliminate the threat posed by their activities, yet 
the main focus of the plans continues to be the war against main force units. In the section 
detailing goals for the measurement of success in Vietnam, elimination of the VCI is the 
fourteenth goal out of twenty-five in 1968 and the eighth out often in 1969. (MACV, 
1968: p. 4; 1969: p. 5) MACVs recognition of the VCI as a major threat continued to 
expand but also continued to fall short of identifying the VCI as the major threat. 
The 1970 and 1971 campaign plans represent MACVs best estimate of the 
importance of the VCI. In the former the elimination of the VCI is included in the actual 








own annex, moving up from Annex J in 1968 and 1969 to Annex C in 1970 and 1971. 
The 1971 plan gauges the importance of the anti - VCI campaign: 
The degree of success of the RVN counterinsurgency effort is directly 
related to the success in accomplishing this objective. It is therefore 
axiomatic that an aggressive and hard - hitting attack on the VC 
infrastructure is as important as, and must be accomplished in conjunction 
with, the war against NVA and VC military forces. While the attack on the 
VC infrastructure cannot be successful without local security resulting from 
military operations, the attack against the VC/NVA will not produce 
lasting results unless the VCI, which is the foundation of the overall 
Communist effort, is neutralized. (MACV, 1971: p. C-3) 
MACVs recognition of the VCI as the communists' center of gravity came too late, 
however, because the United States had failed to protect its own center of gravity 
adequately and was in the process of withdrawing. 
Neutralization of the VCI remained a top priority of the Republic of Vietnam's 
Pacification and Development Plans yet MACVs plans did not share this approach until 
1970. The pacification plan has as its second objective (immediately following territorial 
security): 
Neutralize the VC Infrastructure and expand the rule of law and 
order. All local forces must cooperate closely with the people in 
neutralization of the enemy infrastructure in order to insure a peaceful, 
happy life for every man. Increase the pressure with sharp attacks on the 
enemy infrastructure by the effective use of the Phung Hoang [Phoenix] 
organizations at every level. (RVN, 1970: p. 6) 
This emphasis contrasts with MACVs pre 1970 prioritization of the counter VCI effort 
and attempts by MACV to separate that effort from its campaign plans is indicative of 
MACVs inability to recognize the communists' center of gravity. 
Combat after - action reports paralleled MACVs increasing awareness of the VCI 
and reflected its emphasis on the large unit war. Early reports contain little or no 
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reference to the VCI but by 1969, a report by the 173rd Airborne Brigade mentions that 
the Viet Cong in their area of operations,H... possessed, in these hamlets and villages, a 
Viet Cong infrastructure that dates back into the days of French control of Vietnam." 
(173rd Airborne, 1969: p. 1) This not only indicates that units noted the presence of VCI 
but also demonstrates the longevity of the VCI in the countryside. This permanent 
presence of VCI mtermingled with the population put the United States and Republic of 
Vietnam at a significant disadvantage in terms of contact time with the population. 
MACVs reluctance to make the VCI a top priority only exacerbated the situation. 
General Abrams' LRPTG also noted the vital role played by the VCI in the 
Vietnam war and recommended that, "Combat operations after July 1970 should be only 
those required to reduce the hreconcilables, the hard core VC small units, and the VC 
infrastructure." (LRPTG, 1969: p. 14) July 1970 was supposed to be the end of the 
large unit war after the successful destruction of staging areas in Cambodia, Laos, and 
North Vietnam by air and, in the case of the former two, ground campaigns. In spite of 
the awareness of the importance of the VCI and the increased emphasis placed on its 
elimination by MACV, the large unit war remained paramount. Dale Andrade' comments 
on the dynamics of the United States' counter VCI program in Vietnam: 
Unlike enemy guerrilla units the infrastructure must remain among the 
people in order to keep the revolution alive. Yet American and South 
Vietnamese units chased the guerrillas while the VCI was left virtually 
untouched during the early phases of American involvement in Vietnam. 
The political infrastructure must be the primary target from the onset of 
any counterinsurgency effort. In Vietnam both the GVN and the United 
States waited too long. (Andrade', 1990: p. 283) 










give it equal footing with the conventional war. Its failure to see the Vietnam War as a 
popular struggle rather than a conventional one contributed to this myopia and allowed the 
communists to cement their relationship to the people. 
E. NONUNEARITY AND FRICTION IN WAR 
The last nonlinear phenomenon in war is the presence of Clausewitz's concept of 
friction, which also gets its own chapter. He sums this phenomenon up in the following 
way: "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties 
accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has 
experienced war." (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 119) He goes on to describe the relationship of 
friction to every other component of war: "This tremendous friction, which cannot, as in 
mechanics, be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings 
about effects that cannot be measured, just because they are largely due to chance." 
(Clausewitz, 1989: p. 120) Just as friction in a physical system is nonlinear, so it is with 
war in Clausewitz's theory. Nichols and Tagarev also identify it with chaos theory: 
Basically there will be events in war, perhaps as a result of chance, that 
have an effect out of all proportion to their apparent importance. This is an 
exceedingly difficult form of nonlinearity to anticipate, but it can be taken 
advantage of once it happens. The German doctrine of Auftragstaktik, 
which allowed initiative on the part of junior commanders, was designed to 
do precisely this. (Nichols and Tagarev, 1994:   p. 56) 
Clausewitz's conception of friction, then, is inherently nonlinear and interacts with every 
component of the larger system, which is chaotic in nature. 
Friction also manifests itself differently in conventional and popular wars. Garry 
Wills differentiates between two types of friction in his book, Uncertain Trumpets: "A 
second way that war slips out of control is through what Clausewitz calls friction 
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{Friktion) - the perpetual failure of all parts of a military action to mesh because each rubs 
up against different obstacles, external and internal.1' (Wills, 1994: p. 86)  Internal 
friction is the accumulation of errors within the system of one belligerent independent of 
the activities of its opponent. External friction, on the other hand, is that produced by the 
interaction of opposing sides.  In conventional war, friction of both types occurs yet 
rarely feeds back into the political realm because of the relative "separation" of military 
means and political ends. Further, it can be overcome by redundancy and increases in 
material and technological solutions because of the aforementioned limited feedback of 
military means into political goals. In the Gulf War, for example, the United States was 
able to overcome the possible friction caused by poor weather at the outset of the ground 
war via advanced technology. Even if the ground war had been delayed, however, the 
lack of feedback in the ends - means interaction meant that it could have still been 
successful at a later date. 
In popular war, in contrast, the tight linkage of political goals and military activity 
makes the impact of friction potentially critical to both. Due to the political nature of 
popular war, technological solutions are of limited use and increased increments of 
firepower can be detrimental. The United States clearly had an advantage in technology 
and firepower, yet it was unable to translate that into victory in Vietnam. When friction 
did intervene, as at My Lai, the political consequences for the United States were 
devastating. 
The varying influence of friction in popular and conventional wars means that an 
intervening power must be sensitive to the solutions it applies to combat it. In 
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conventional wars, technological and material solutions are useful and contribute to 
victory. In popular wars, on the other hand, these solutions may have no effect or may be 
positively damaging to the attainment of political goals. Further, friction has a greater 
effect on the intervener in a popular war because the manifestations ofthat friction have 
immediate political ramifications, which, in turn, have a magnified impact on the intervener 
because the struggle is not one of survival. 
In the Vietnam War, as in any war, friction dominated the battlefield yet 
technological and material solutions proved ineffective in combatting it. Robert 
McNamara confronts this reality in his postmortem of the Vietnam War: 
We failed then - as we have since - to recognize the limitations of modern, 
high - technology military equipment, forces, and doctrine in confronting 
unconventional, highly motivated people's movements. We failed as well 
to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of 
people from a totally different culture. (McNamara, 1995: p. 322) 
Firepower and technology proved to be an effective means of countering internal friction 
and limiting casualties but was inimicable to the success of defeating the insurgency and 
winning the support of the population. Eric Bergerud addresses this paradox in his book, 
The Dynamics of Defeat: 
In theory, American troops on pacification duty were there to protect the 
villagers and support the GWs efforts to create political support, on one 
hand, and "kill VC" with the least possible cost in American lives, on the 
other. U.S. combat methods were well enough suited for the second half 
of this mission, but they were very bad for the first. (Bergerud, 1991: p. 
174) 
The combat methods alluded to in this passage refer to the use of material solutions to the 
problems of friction. The preponderance of physical power enjoyed by the United States 
was unable to overcome the effect of friction in internal wars such as the one in Vietnam 
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because it was applied in a conventional manner that did not recognize the negative impact 
it was having on the political spectrum ofthat conflict, both in the United States and in the 
theater of operations. 
The role of friction in a popular war, with its political ramifications, demanded 
operational planning that sought to limit its effects rather than magnify them. Such plans 
should have carefully limited the amount and type of firepower employed and 
concentrated it in remote regions. The inherently local and political nature of the conflict 
meant that MACV had to decentralize operations to the local level and pay close attention 
to the political ramifications of its attempts to overcome friction. Indiscriminate 
firepower, large scale combat operations, and the use of technology to overcome friction 
would reduce United States' casualties but would have the simultaneous effect of harming 
the political goals for which the United States was fighting. 
MACV failed to keep friction's effects at the tactical level because it sought to 
counter tactical level friction with firepower and technology but did not attenuate the 
impact of those solutions on the psychological and political realms of the war. Guidance 
for the use of air strikes and naval gunfire in the combined campaign plans issued by 
MACV is evidence of this. All of the orders from 1966 -1971 list identical tasks to be 
accomplished by the air and naval arms. Invariably, the top missions assigned to the 
Vietnamese and United States air forces were close air support for ground forces, logistic 
support, interdiction of cross border infiltration routes, and air offensives against "known 
or suspected" main force units and bases. (MACV, 1966: p. 159; 1967: pp. 29-30; 1968: 









on destruction of these main force bases using air power followed by ground operations. 
It states, "Maximum use will be made of B-52 bomber strikes and other Air Force and 
Naval firepower, with rapid follow-up by ground forces to complete neutralization." 
(MACV, 1967: p. H-2)  These forces represented answers to friction because they 
reduced casualties that would be sustained by ground forces operating in a hostile area 
but, when coupled with the aforementioned liberal rules of engagement, created political 
friction by alienating the population. 
MACVs operational planning gave air power and naval gunfire a major role in the 
war to reduce friendly combatant casualties, yet these same policies contradicted the 
Republic of Vietnam's Pacification and Development Plan by causing widespread damage 
to the civilian population. The pacification plan states: 
Special care and precaution will be exercised in the conduct of military 
operations in populated areas including populated areas in the clearing and 
border surveillance zones. Emphasis will be placed on minimizing 
noncombatant casualties and destruction of civil property through restraints 
placed on indirect and aerial fire support. (RVN, 1970: p. 1-2) 
The tasks listed for air and naval forces and directives to use B-52 strikes in base areas, 
known as clearing areas in the pacification plan, conflicts with the effort to give the 
population meaningful security. This attempt to counter friction and save combatant 
casualties had the unpleasant side effect of driving the population into the arms of the Viet 
Cong, who could and did use the indiscriminate use of firepower as a propaganda tool. 
Use of organic indirect fire assets also saved friendly forces* lives but contributed 
to the alienation of the population by causing casualties among them. South Vietnamese 
military personnel were initially reluctant to employ indirect fire but their association with 
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the United States Army soon convinced them of the efficacy of it as a means to save lives. 
The American 1st Cavalry Division's after - action report of the Pleiku Campaign states: 
US advisors too have become more optimistic, not so much about 
the eventual defeat of the Viet Cong, but that the ARVN commanders will 
be more receptive concerning adoption of concepts that heretofore have 
been belittled or rejected. For example, advisors with the ARVN Airborne 
Brigade are confident that the dramatic demonstration of what close 
support artillery can do for infantry will go far to convince the brigade of 
the desirability of training officer forward observers. (1st CAV, 1965: p. 
124) 
The effect ofthat close support artillery was equally dramatic for civilians caught in it and 
their resulting sympathy for the Viet Cong, who refrained from using it (out of necessity, 
to be sure) is understandable. Thus MACV's response to friction - firepower - had dire 
consequences for the population and the political aims which its plans were designed to 
obtain. 
General Abrams' LRPTG emphasized the impact of United States military 
operations on South Vietnam, although it did not specifically address the indiscriminate 
use of air, naval, or artillery assets. "Every action of US forces," it concludes, "has socio - 
psychological implications." (LRPTG, 1969: p. 23) Larry Cable addresses MACV's 
failure to take note of this statement: 
... American doctrine and its tactical implementation would result in 
significant civilian casualties or social dislocation. Either of these would 
simply provide grist for the insurgents' propaganda mill. The dependence 
upon heavy firepower central to U.S. doctrine, particularly the emphasis 
upon the employment of artillery and aerial bombardment in harassment 
and interdiction or area denial missions, worked to assure that neutral or 
potentially friendly civilians would be caught in the middle and converted 
into either rootless refugees or insurgent activists. (Cable, 1986: p. 283) 
MACVs operational planning, then, attempted to use firepower as a solution to friction 
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for the purpose of saving the lives of friendly combatants and maximizing the destruction 
on the enemy. The nonlinear feedback of the policies, however, ultimately stymied the 
efforts of the Republic of Vietnam to win the population to its side. This attempt, the 
central one in a popular war, was crucial to success in Vietnam but was undermined by 
policies that simultaneously combatted operational friction while creating strategic friction. 
The four interacting parts of war addressed by Clausewitz: friction, the 
"paradoxical trinity," ends and means, and opposing sides, all represent nonlinear 
dynamical relationships. Alan Beyerchen points out, "On War is suffiised with the 
understanding that every war is inherently a nonlinear phenomenon, the conduct of which 
changes its character in ways that cannot be analytically predicted." (Beyerchen, 1993: 
p. 61) When combined with the fact that these components of war interact in a nonlinear 
fashion with each other in addition to internally, the idea of Clausewitz's theory as a 
philosophical chaotic system gains even more credence. 
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V. ORDER IN CHAOS 
A. CHAOS, CLAUSEWITZ, AND LINEARITY IN WAR 
The nonlinearity of these interactions in war does not imply that no linearties exist 
within the system, however. Clausewitz clearly identifies such linear relationships as the 
decisiveness of superior numbers in an engagement if applied at the critical time and place 
and the presence of a decisive center of gravity on each side of the conflict. (Clausewitz, 
1989: pp. 194,617) Likewise, linearities may exist in a chaotic system such as the 
relationships specified in Newton's laws of motion. Like these laws, however, the 
applicability of these linearities depends on other variables. Just as Einstein's general 
theory of relativity pointed out that Newton's laws were not universally applicable, 
Clausewitz points out that superior numbers are not universally decisive in war. 
(Clausewitz, 1989: p. 137) Chaotic systems, then, may contain both linear and nonlinear 
relationships and, indeed, exhibit a mixture of predictability and unpredictability 
characterized by the next feature of chaos theory examined in this paper. 
Linear relationships also play a part in distinguishing popular from conventional 
war. The center of gravity, for example, is typically a linear product of a nonlinear 
interaction between the armed forces, state, and population of a belligerent. It is linear in 
that it can be identified and targeted, and concentration on the center of gravity will yield a 
proportionate outcome. Superiority in numbers is another linearity exhibited by both types 
of war. The difference between the two is a qualitative one because the center of gravity 
in a popular war resides mainly in political power while that of a conventional war is 
mainly in military power. Superior numbers in a conventional war mean concentration in 
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space and time to apply massive physical force but in a popular war it means concentration 
on the human terrain to apply political force. Leites and Wolf comment on the role of 
superior numbers in conventional and popular wars: 
Still, as noted earlier, an important contrast exists between force 
ratios in counterinsurgency and in conventional wars. The contrast arises 
from the fact that where there is a front line in the battle area, the defender 
generally has a strong advantage, one further strengthened by defensive 
fortifications. Consequently, although there are major exceptions - Israel's 
rout of much larger Arab forces in the six-day war of June 1967 is a 
striking example - the familiar planning factor of two or three to one in 
favor of the defender reflects this advantage. Where there is no front line, 
as in counterinsurgency, this model no longer applies, and it is more 
appropriate to use an air-defense model. The defender does not know 
where an attack may come. Hence, even if he is able to keep an advantage 
by maintaining a high-level alert at each of the targets, there are so many 
targets to defend that the aggregate force ratio becomes much larger than 
that of the attacking force. (Leites and Wolf, 1970: p. 86) 
The dispersed nature of the insurgents' military power makes it difficult to achieve 
numerical superiority at any given point because the defender does not know where or 
when the insurgents will attack. The insurgents thus enjoy an advantage similar to 
operating on interior lines where they can defeat the defender in detail. The defender, for 
his part, must now have an aggregate superiority of numbers at far greater than three to 
one in order to make up for this disadvantage. The linear relationship of superior numbers 
to victory holds, as long as those numbers reflect an appreciation of the type of war the 
external power is involved in and are deployed and employed accordingly. Thus the 
physical concentration of force in the Gulf War yielded military victory whereas the same 
type of concentration produced defeat in Vietnam for the United States. Numbers count, 
therefore, but in qualitatively distinct ways. 
80 
  ti  t l  i  i l f r   i    it  
 t   t i  t  l  iti l f r . it       
  i      
,   ,  i  
   
 t    
   







    
  il  
  i . t, 
l
 
The implications of the different types of linearities present in conventional and 
popular war for an external power are manifest in the different types of forces that are 
appropriate for each conflict. Conventional wars are best fought by conventional forces, 
whose specialty is concentration in a physical way and employment of massive firepower. 
Popular wars, on the other hand, should be fought mainly by counterinsurgency forces, 
whose specialty is concentration in a psychological and political way with discriminately 
applied violence. Further, the host government is the touchstone for the successful 
prosecution of a popular war. Superior numbers count but more closely resemble a police 
force for popular wars than the purely military numbers associated with conventional war. 
B. LINEARITY AND THE VIETNAM WAR, 1966 - 1971 
The Vietnam War is an excellent example of how linear relationships in war 
depend as much on qualitative measures as quantitative. Although the United States 
forces deployed in Vietnam were of good quality - both in the physical and psychological 
sense of the word - they were more suited to a conventional war than a popular one. By 
any comparison of physical power - firepower, material, technology, GNP, etc. - the 
United States should have been successful by a wide margin. This was not the case, 
however, because the United States approached the linearity part of war from a 
conventional standpoint. Rather than focusing its attention on the population, it focused 
on the communist main force units who existed for the very reason of drawing the United 
States' attention away from the political battle being waged over the human terrain. 
Krepinevich writes: 
A USIA study prepared for the president and presented on 27 February 
[1966] noted that "the principle problems facing us in obtaining the support 
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of the Vietnamese population are inadequate security and ineffective 
Government." The USIA researchers concluded, "The population is 
largely apathetic and is primarily interested in ending the twenty years of 
war; they care less as to which side will win, although there appears to be a 
substantial degree of approval of the Viet Cong." (Krepinevich, 1986: 
p. 139) 
Further, the United States' concentration of forces to conduct large unit operations to 
defeat the communist main forces ensured that there were never enough forces available 
for pacification duty, which required a permanent presence at the hamlet level. 
The role of superior numbers that confronted MACV demanded a response that 
placed a dispersed, permanent presence of police forces at the hamlet level throughout 
South Vietnam. Operational planning had to emphasize the pacification effort and 
distribute resources accordingly by treating the conventional war in the central highlands 
as a contingency and adjunct to the main operation of pacification in the Mekong Delta 
and coastal plain regions. Again, this required an integrated and politically sensitive 
response that devoted a great deal of attention to the host country's involvement. 
MACVs operational planning failed to fulfill the requirement to place qualitative 
and quantitative emphasis on pacification by devoting most of its attention to the 
conventional aspects of the war. Each of the combined campaign plans issued by MACV 
through 1969 during the years of direct United States involvement contains a map that 
designates priority areas on which subordinate units were supposed to concentrate. The 
plans for 1970 and 1971 contain maps that designate Viet Cong and People's Army of 
Vietnam bases which subordinate unites are supposed to attack. AU of the orders also 
contain specific guidance for each Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), a geographic region within 
which corps sized units made up of both American and South Vietnamese forces operated. 
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The combination of priorities on the maps, enclosed at Appendix A, and the prioritized 
task list for each CTZ show that MACV did not assign the populated rural areas the 
emphasis they demanded as the critical areas of the war effort in either a qualitative or 
quantitative way. 
The 1966 order's priority efforts were in the right general location on the map - the 
coastal plains and Mekong Delta regions, but concentrated around major cities such as 
Danang and logistics area such as Cam Ranh Bay. (MACV, 1966: p. 161) Although 
these area were important, more vital were the rice producing regions that linked these 
provincial cities together. Further, the tasks assigned to the CTZ commanders begin with 
the mission of defending logistics bases as the top priority, followed by defense of major 
cities, clearing of designated areas, opening of major highways, then controlling the rice 
producing areas in each sector. (MACV, 1966: pp. 155-8) It was in this last area that 
the main battle was taking place, not in the governmental centers or logistics bases. All 
things considered, however, the 1966 order represents a fair start from the prioritization 
standpoint because it does not designate the central highlands as a priority area and at 
least mentions the pacification effort in the rice producing regions. 
The 1967 combined campaign plan represents the best effort by MACV to 
graphically depict the regions of real importance in the war and assign tasks to subordinate 
commands that were consonant with pacification. The map designates the entire coastal 
plains and Mekong Delta regions as "Areas for Priority of Military Offensive Operations." 
(MACV, 1967: Encl. 1) In so doing, MACV correctly identified the critical region of the 
war but qualitatively missed the mark by designating the areas as having priority for 
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"military offensive operations." Given MACVs focus on the large unit war and the liberal 
use of firepower by friendly forces, this phrase may have been an unfortunate choice for 
the inhabitants of those areas for reasons already discussed. 
According to the 1967 plan Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces in each region 
had the missions of population security in the national priority areas and other populated 
regions, defense of large towns and cities, opening of major highways, control of rice and 
other critical resources, and destruction of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese main forces 
in the regions designated for offensive operations. (MACV, 1967: pp. 9-11) The United 
States forces in each CTZ were to destroy main force units in the areas designated for 
offensive operations, support the pacification effort, destroy main force units outside the 
priority areas, open major highways, and assist in the control of critical resources. 
(MACV, 1967: pp. 11-13)  The allocation of forces to the critical areas is laudable from 
the quantitative standpoint but fails the qualitative test due to the emphasis on countering 
main force units using sustained offensive operations. 
The 1968 combined campaign plan mirrors the 1967 one in that it includes the 
entire coastal plain and Mekong Delta regions but also includes, for the first time, part of 
the central highlands as a priority region for offensive operations. It also drops the 
national priority areas for pacification, thus focusing the entire effort on offensive military 
operations. (MACV, 1968: End. 1) Like its predecessor, it assigns South Vietnamese 
units in the CTZ's the mission of providing territorial security to pacification areas 
(enclosed on a separate map), defending major towns and cities, opening major highways, 
controlling vital resources, and disrupting Viet Cong tax collection efforts. (MACV, 
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1968: pp. 14-15) United States forces in each CTZ had the mission of destroying main 
forces in the priority regions on the map, destroying main forces located outside those 
areas, opening major highways, maintaining active surveillance of infiltration routes, and 
actively patrolling to locate main force units. Like the 1967 campaign plan the 1968 one 
continues the offensive, large unit focus and expands its operations into the central 
highlands. 
The 1969 plan presents a map that combines pacification zones and areas of 
offensive operations on the same diagram. Pacification continues to focus on areas 
surrounding large cities and logistics bases, while offensive operations are designated for 
the entire central highlands as well as the regions between pacification zones. (MACV, 
1969: Incl. 1) The priority of effort remains the same as in the 1968 plan, but now 
popular forces assume the tasks in each CTZ formerly designated for the entire South 
Vietnamese armed forces, and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam joins the military 
forces of the United States in the offensive effort. (MACV, 1969: pp. 14-18) MACVwas 
right to put both campaigns on the same map but relegating the pacification effort to 
popular forces and expanding the offensive operations represents both a quantitative and 
qualitative misallocation of forces. 
The 1970 and 1971 combined campaign plans drop the "priority areas" concept, 
which had some merit, and focused even more on enemy main force units. The maps in 
these plans depict Viet Cong and North Vietnamese base areas that subordinate units are 
to eliminate. They are mostly in the central highlands, although a few are located in the 
populated regions. (MACV, 1970: p. L-l-1; 1971: p. K-l-1) It was against these areas, 
85 
: . -  it  t t  f r s i      i  t i   
f r es i  t  i it  i   t  , tr i  i  r s l t  i   
, i   , i i  i    
ti l  li   l  i   .     






l : . -l-l; : . l ) t i t t ,
 
incidentally, that the campaign plan exhorted commanders to use B-52's. The tasks 
assigned to each CTZ are qualitatively superior to those in earlier plans from the 
standpoint of participation in a popular war. Corps commanders, both American and 
South Vietnamese, are to gain and maintain security in their regions, attack main forces in 
their area of operations, interdict infiltration routes, conduct active reconnaissance of their 
regions to detect main force units, and defend major cities and towns within the CTZ's. 
(MACV, 1970: pp. 16-21; 1971: pp. 15-21) MACV properly assigned security to the 
top position in the task list and gave United States and South Vietnamese commanders the 
same priorities. Like the counter VCI effort, however, this emphasis was too late and was 
contradicted by other guidance in the plans, such as the continued reliance upon territorial 
forces for pacification while regular units conducted large scale offensive operations. 
The Republic of Vietnam's Pacification and Development Plan placed its emphasis 
on local security in hamlets before destruction of main force units operating elsewhere. 
The 1970 plan lists the tasks that must be accomplished to obtain security for the 
population as maintenance of security secure areas, gaining security in Viet Cong 
controlled areas, neutralizing the VCI, forcing Viet Cong and North Vietnamese main 
forces to leave South Vietnam, and establishing a system not dependent upon the United 
States. (RVN, 1970: p. 1-1-2) MACVs campaign plans never matched the pacification 
plan, seeking instead to oust communist main forces rather than establish permanent local 
security for the population. The prioritization of tasks given to the CTZ's and the 
continued emphasis on offensive operation despite their negative effect on the populations 




Combat after - action reports reflect MACVs focus on the large unit war in 
the central highlands to a significant degree. The United States 1st Cavalry Division's 
report on the Pleiku Campaign in 1965 is illustratative of this because it received 
widespread attention and was the first use of a divisional size unit in the war. It concludes 
with the statement: 
During the period 23 October to 25 November 1965, elements of 
the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) supported by USAF and other US 
Army Units and in cooperation with ARVN forces, conducted a highly 
successful campaign against major enemy forces in PLEIKU Province. 
This campaign destroyed major elements of three NVA regiments and had 
the strategic importance of interrupting the planned future operation of the 
NVA in the central highland region of Vietnam. (1st CAV, 1965: p. 132) 
This illustrates MACVs failure to emphasize pacification because the area the division was 
operating in was not in one of the priority areas noted in the campaign plan. Further, its 
employment in mass and its very mobility via helicopter worked against the principles of 
counterinsurgency, which relies on permanent presence of dispersed forces at the hamlet 
level. 
MACVs operational plans, then, did not employ the forces at its disposal in a 
manner consistent with the dictates of a popular war in either a quantitative or qualitative 
way. General Abrams' LRPTG notes the paradox of successful military operations being 
counterproductive to the ultimate political goals of the war and notes that the military 
effort uses 90% of MACVs resource expenditures. (LRPTG, 1969: p. 18)   Eric 
Bergerud describes MACVs operational methods: 
The combat battalions supported by this massive structure were 
very flexible, exceptionally mobile, and extremely powerful. Despite six 
years of war and scores of major engagements, American ground forces did 
not lose a single battle in Vietnam. Yet, the factors that made American 
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units so formidable in battle also dictated that they be relatively few in 
number. Consequently, U.S. commanders in Vietnam were reluctant to 
disperse what combat strength they did possess in an attempt to control the 
largest possible area with the fewest possible men. Rather, commanders 
sought important objectives, usually enemy main force units or safe zones, 
that would allow them to concentrate the forces available and use the 
maximum amount of firepower. This tendency was particularly marked 
before 1969, when the enemy was employing large main force units in 
almost every part of Vietnam. Within this context, the large-unit war 
conducted by the United States during the first three years of possessed a 
compelling internal logic. The logic of the situation, however, thwarted the 
desires of many Americans concerned with the village war, who wanted to 
have U.S. forces widely dispersed and employed directly in support of the 
various pacification plans. (Bergerud, 1991: p. 88) 
The internal logic of MACV's focus on the large unit war did not, however, solve the 
external problem facing it: an insurgency focused at the hamlet level. General Bruce 
Palmer assesses the communist's strategy in using the central highlands as an attempt at 
"... weakening South Vietnam's pacification program by drawing forces away from 
populated areas, exposing other important areas to attack, inflicting casualties on allied 
forces, and expending their time and resources in unnecessary and unprofitable moves." 
(Palmer, 1984: p. 182) In this the communists were successful, in part because MACV 






VI. DETERMINISITC DISORDER 
A. CHAOS, CLAUSEWITZ, AND WAR AS A DETERMINISTIC SYSTEM 
The third aspect of chaotic systems in Kellert's definition are their deterministic 
nature. This term has at least four definitions identified by Kellert: total predictability, 
value determinateness, unique evolution, and differential dynamics. (Kellert, 1993: p.50) 
Respectively, these definitions decrease in the restrictiveness of their requirements. Total 
predictability means that if the initial conditions of a system can be determined to a high 
degree of accuracy, then the end state can be predicted. An example of total predictability 
is the calculation of the effect of the moon and earth's gravity on the Apollo 13 spacecraft 
used to "slingshot" it around the moon to reenter earth's gravitational pull. Value 
determinateness means that the system is composed of a finite number of properties with 
real values. In addition to space travel, this includes the example of convection, in which 
the variables operating in the system: air, heat, gravity, and volume, are finite and 
measurable in real terms. Unique evolution means that the evolution of a system is fixed 
once we specify the state of the system at any given time. In other words, the outcome of 
a system is determined by the values and interrelationships of its variables at a given time. 
This precludes the intervention of random or chance occurrences which may upset those 
specified quantities. The last definition, differential dynamics, means that the system may 
be described by differential equations, i.e., it is not random. Meteorology is an example of 
this because one can describe the activity of weather systems by using equations at a given 
time but the effects of chance and chaos make any long term prediction of its final state 
impossible. Although the scientific community continues to debate which, if any, of these 
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definitions apply to chaotic systems, this thesis will use a philosophical interpretation of 
Kellert's concept, which concurs with the last version, differential dynamics. He writes: 
"Given the current state of the universe, the future will be fixed, but fixed 
only within a huge spectrum of distinguishable possibilities. .. Chaos and 
quantum theory lead us to just such a vision of the universe as a congeries 
of interrelated but open possibilities, foaming forth in its infinitude." 
(Kellert, 1993: p. 73) 
This idea of determinism means that chaotic phenomena such as war are not completely 
random, they are dynamical systems, yet the number of possible outcomes covers a very 
wide spectrum of possibilities within some established bounds. Returning to the example 
of the weather, we know that seasons recur with regularity yet long term prediction of 
weather systems or the relative severity of those seasons remains impossible. It is this 
"orderly disorder" which is a hallmark of chaotic systems in general and war in particular. 
In spite of its nonlinearity, Clausewitz's war remains deterministic. In On War, this 
deterministic nature comes from Clausewitz's most often quoted statement, "We see, 
therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a 
continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means." (Clausewitz, 1989: 
p. 87) He also identifies the spectrum of possible outcomes which, though broad, is 
nonetheless finite. He writes: 
Generally speaking, a military objective that matches the political object in 
scale will, if the latter is reduced, be reduced in proportion; this will be all 
the more so as the political object increases its predominance. Thus it 
follows that without any inconsistency wars can have all degree of 
importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to 
simple armed observation. (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 81) 
Historian Hans Rothfels comments on Clausewitz's recognition of war's attachment to its 










interpretation that Clausewitz surveys the whole of military history. No single event can 
be separated from its socio - political preconditions and from the whole atmosphere of 
tension." (Rothfels, 1971: p. 107) For Clausewitz, then, war remains nonlinear and 
unpredictable yet bounded by politics, which makes it dynamical and deterministic. This 
"orderly disorder" is unique to chaos theory, making Clausewitz's theory bear an even 
closer resemblance to it. 
The deterministic nature of war arises from the previously discussed interaction 
between policy and means, and it highlights the distinction between popular and 
conventional war. In the latter the relatively low level of feedback in the ends - means 
relationship makes policy less confining to the operational commander. Thus the theater 
commander in the Gulf War, General Norman Schwarzkopf, had considerable latitude in 
the application of violence against Iraq's armed forces and state apparatus. 
Popular wars, however, exhibit considerable feedback from the application offeree 
to the political sphere, which makes policy more confining to the operational commander. 
The inherently political nature of the war, the "zero - sum" nature of the insurgent's goals, 
and the direct participation of elements of society make this so. Leites and Wolf contrast 
the application of violence by insurgents with that of the regime, or authority. 
In general, there is a sharp contrast between R[ebellion] and 
Authority] with respect to the style and effectiveness with which they use 
the threat and imposition of damage. The pattern employed by R is 
strikingly more effective... In the case of A, damage - infliction on the 
population usually emerges as fallout from other activities rather than as 
conscious design. As a result, the quantum of damage inflicted by A is 
often inflated and capricious rather than limited and discriminating. (Leites 
and Wolf, 1970: p. 155) 
The limited force applied by insurgents, whether by design or by lack of capability or both, 
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contrasts sharply with the regime's use of massive force. Further, the regime often 
inadvertently attacks the population in its conventional attempts to kill the insurgents, who 
are intermingled with the population. In Vietnam, therefore, MACV faced a situation 
wherein military activity immediately affected policy by harming the population and was, 
in turn, limited by it. 
The different level of determinism exhibited by conventional and popular wars 
means that the operational commander in the latter must be more sensitive to the political 
effects of the means employed than his conventional counterpart. Violence in popular 
wars must be meted out in a discriminate manner and the forces being employed must 
remain in touch with the surrounding population in a meaningful way. In conventional 
wars, on the other hand, violence may be used in a more concentrated way and at a higher 
level because the opposition's military is not directly tied to the population. 
B. THE DETERMINISTIC NATURE OF THE VIETNAM WAR, 1966 -1971 
The Vietnam War exhibited the restrictive influence of policy on means 
characteristic of popular wars. The political nature of the Vietnam War, with its focus on 
the population, and the zero - sum goals of all of the participants except the United States 
made policy particularly confining to MACV. The more involved the United States 
became, the more feedback from the application of force crippled its ability to win 
politically. John Shy writes: 
Whether an Americanized war could have been won, short of destroying 
the country and its population, continues to be a debated question. But 
surely massive American military intervention exacerbated the basic 
political, social, and economic conditions that gave revolutionary war, in 
Vietnam and elsewhere, its impetus. And Americanizing the war made it 
almost impossible for the vital political effort, necessarily a civilian effort, 
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to deal with whatever made so many Vietnamese ready to wage or support 
a revolutionary war. (Paret, 1986: p. 856) 
Thus the United States' effort to kill its way to victory by destroying communist main 
force units was doomed to failure because it produced feedback effects into the political 
realm that, in return, made those efforts inimicable to finding a political solution. 
The task facing MACV was to produce campaign plans that attenuated the amount 
of feedback into the political sphere in South Vietnam and in the United States. To do 
this, operational planning had to be politically sensitive and consider the political 
implications of every use of force. Operations that had the potential for widespread 
destruction, such as air campaigns and large, mechanized operations, had to be carefully 
analyzed to ensure that the military benefits outweighed the political costs due to 
feedback. Policies that permitted or encouraged killing for its own sake, such as body 
counts and directives to "kill VC," had to be very restrictive lest abuses of those policies 
further estrange the population. Further, the use of American troops had to be carefully 
considered because of the limited aims being pursued by the United States and the 
increasing unpopularity of the war. 
MACVs operational plans failed to limit the feedback of the military means 
employed on the political ends due to its focus on the large unit war, discussed in Chapter 
IV, Section C. The combined campaign plans also failed to address the deterministic 
nature of the Vietnam War by engaging United States forces in operations guaranteed to 
produce casualties and wreak havoc on the population. The 1966 plan states, "US and 
FWMA forces will be responsible for security of their major bases, clearing in the vicinity 








producing area." (MACV, 1966: p. 153) MACVs focus for American forces at the 
beginning was on the logistics bases that supplied both United States and South 
Vietnamese and on critical national resources: not a bad start from the viewpoint of the 
deterministic nature of a popular war. 
By 1967, however, the focus for United States forces was clearly on the "war of 
the battalions." The combined campaign plan for that year states: 
The primary mission of U.S. and FWMAF will be to destroy the VC/NVA 
main forces, base areas, and resources and/or drive the enemy into the 
sparsely populated and food - scarce areas; secure their base areas and 
clear in the vicinity of these bases; and as directed assist in the protection 
and control of national resources. (MACV, 1967: p. 4) 
The introduction of operations against main force units with a concomitant rise in 
American casualties in this year as the top priority for United States forces coincided with 
the first large scale protests against the war at home. 
The combined campaign plans for 1968 and 1969 are identical in terms of the 
missions assigned to United States forces in Vietnam: 
US/FWMAF will have the primary responsibility for: 
(a) Destroying the VC/NVA main forces, base areas, and resources; 
(b) Containment operations along the DMZ and adjacent border sanctuary 
areas to deny the enemy use of infiltration and invasion routes; 
(c) Assisting and reinforcing RVNAF as necessary in opening and securing 
LOC's, providing security for selected priority areas and protecting national 
resources. (MACV, 1968: p. 8; 1969: p. 8) 
In this case the focus continues to be on operations against main force units, with the 
added mission of countering North Vietnamese thrusts across the Demilitarized Zone or 
from neighboring Cambodia and Laos. 
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The combined campaign plans for 1970 and 1971 give identical mission to the 
regular forces of both the United States and the Republic of Vietnam: 
First, the regular forces of FWMAF and RVNAF, to include the Civilian 
Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), will conduct operations primarily to: 
1. Locate and neutralize enemy main forces, base areas, and logistics 
systems in RVN. 
2. Deter enemy incursions into RVN along the DMZ, the Laotian and 
Cambodian borders, and in coastal waters. 
3. Prevent enemy incursions into consolidation zones and secure areas. 
(MACV, 1970: p. 7; 1971: p. 5) 
MACVs focus for American forces thus remained on the large unit war until the very end 
of direct involvement by the United States. Operational planning tasked American units to 
do the very missions that they could least afford to do as the forces representing an 
external power with limited aims. 
Using United States ground forces in a concentrated way to combat communist 
main force units also gave the Viet Cong a propaganda victory due to the widespread 
destruction that accompanied those operations. The Republic of Vietnam's Pacification 
and Development plan comments: 
In his efforts to achieve political control of RVN, the enemy attempts to 
demonstrate that the GVN is not capable of governing the country or of 
providing credible security to the people. His offensive operations and the 
resultant operations by friendly forces produce adverse effects on security 
of the people (RVN, 1970: p. 1-1-1) 
The combined campaign plans for 1970 and 1971 also take note of the effect of "friendly" 
operations in populated areas and graphically depict the perceptions of threat facing the 
population at large. These tables, included at Appendix B, show that the average villager 
equally feared the Viet Cong and the United States forces - especially artillery and air. 
(MACV, 1970: p. B-l-A-1; 1971: p. B-l-A-1) In spite of the knowledge of the impact 
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of United States' operations on the population, MACV persisted in focusing on the large 
unit war. 
Combat after - action reports also note the effects of friendly operations on the 
population. A trooper of the American 1st Cavalry Division summed up Operation Jeb 
Stuart this way, "We were supposed to search and destroy everything we could find. We 
destroyed a hell of a lot out there. That was the mission we were sent out to do, and we 
did it" (1st CAV, 1968: p. 21) A more specific comment in the 173rd Airborne 
Brigade's report on Operation Dan Sinh states, "An undetermined number of civilians 
moved from the area of operations to avoid being involved with the military operations. It 
is estimated that this number is approximately 2500." (173rd, 1969: p. 15) The impact of 
large unit operations on the population did little to endear the United States to the citizens 
of South Vietnam and increased the amount of feedback felt by political leadership at 
home. 
MACVs operational planning had the unintended effects of alienating the 
populations of both South Vietnam and the United States. It did so in the latter by 
engaging American units in large scale combat with enemy main force units. The large 
battles with significant casualties on both sides, coupled with the images of burning 
hamlets and civilian casualties made the war increasingly unpopular with a vocal minority 
in the United States. General Abrams' LRPTG notes: 
Lack of time is the greatest threat to achievement of the present US 
objectives in Vietnam  This constraint results primarily from an inability to 
coalesce the US national will to pursue our ultimate objectives. Millions of 
US citizens have been persuaded that the US has no legitimate purpose in 
Vietnam, and/or that the matter is hopeless. The desire for "peace" is 
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almost as great among some influential and vocal segments of American 
society as it is among most Vietnamese peasants. (LRPTG, 1969: p. 4) 
Thus MACV's use of United States forces in large unit operations fulfilled the requirement 
to "kill VC" but had the simultaneous effect of "killing popular will." 
In the case of South Vietnamese citizens, the employment of American forces was 
likewise damaging. Robert McNamara comments: 
Shells and napalm rained down on Vietcong and North Vietnamese base 
areas in South Vietnam. It often proved difficult to distinguish combatants 
from noncombatants. Between 1965 and 1967, U.S. and South 
Vietnamese air forces dropped over a million tons of bombs on the South, 
more than twice the tonnage dropped on the North. Fighting produced 
more and more civilian casualties and squalid refugee camps. The 
increasing destruction and misery brought on the country we were 
supposed to be helping troubled me greatly. This also undermined, in an 
unintended but profound way, the pacification program designed to extend 
security to the countryside and win the "hearts and minds" of the South 
Vietnamese people. And it hurt any effort at building popular support for 
the Saigon government, which was crucial to defeating the Vietcong. 
(McNamara, 1995: p. 243) 
MACVs failure to address the deterministic nature of the war in Vietnam led it to focus 
on the conventional aspects ofthat war, which produced significant negative feedback into 
the political situations of both the United States and the Republic of Vietnam. 
Discontinuities will, however, occur in war, and Clausewitz appreciates this in his 
treatment of the subject, remarking, "Between two peoples and two states there can be 
such tensions, such a mass of inflammable material, that the slightest quarrel can produce a 
wholly disproportionate effect - a real explosion." (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 81) One 
example of such a change in warfare is the transition from the wars of Frederick the Great 
to those of Napoleon, in which technology remained virtually unchanged while war 
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underwent a fundamental shift.6 Chaotic systems, too, exhibit discontinuities, such as the 
change in weather patterns from the ice age to the present one. Computer models of the 
atmosphere often result lapse into a glaciated state without any external input. Gleick 
describes this characteristic as almost intransitivity, and remarks that it H. . . displays one 
sort of average behavior for a very long time, fluctuating within certain bounds. Then, for 
no reason whatsoever, it shifts into a different sort of behavior, still fluctuating but 
producing a different average." (Gleick, 1987: p. 170) Such occurrences in nature, as in 
war, are rare yet do occur and are a special feature of chaotic systems. 
"For further information on this subject see: Delbruck, Hans. The Dawn of Modern Warfare. Trans. Walter J. 






VH. THE IRRELEVANCE OF ETERNAL RETURN 
A. CHAOS, CLAUSEWITZ, AND WAR'S APERIODICITY 
The fourth component of Kellert's definition of a chaotic system is its aperiodicity. 
This concept simply means that a dynamical system will never repeat itself in exactly the 
same way. An example of this is the aforementioned computer model of the earth's 
atmosphere which produces a very different outcome for each iteration even if the initial 
conditions are varied only slightly. (CHeick, 1987: p. 15) Ruelle points out the 
implications of this idea for complex dynamical systems such as war, "The historical 
evolution of very complex systems, by contrast, is typically one way: history does not 
repeat itself. For these very complex systems with one - way time evolutions it is usually 
clear that sensitive dependence on initial conditions is present." (Ruelle, 1991: p. 82) 
Chaotic systems, then, do not repeat due to their sensitive dependence on initial 
conditions, a concept discussed in the next chapter. For war, this means that no two will 
be alike and that what is successful in one may not be in another. 
War, too, is aperiodic because it never repeats in exactly the same way; history 
does not repeat itself. For Clausewitz this is true because war is inextricably linked to the 
conditions which bring it about. He writes: 
First, therefore, it is clear that war should never be thought of as 
something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise 
the entire history of war would contradict us. Only this approach will 
enable us to penetrate the problem intelligently. Second, this way of 
looking at it will show us how wars must vary with the nature of their 
motives and of the situations which give rise to them. (Clausewitz, 1989: 
p. 88) 






random not periodic. They are not random because the future of a chaotic system is 
dependent upon initial conditions. They are not periodic because their behavior never 
repeats." (Nichols and Tagarev, 1994: p. 49) Like the nonlinear yet deterministic 
paradox, the aperiodic yet dynamical trait of war is one that is also unique to chaotic 
systems. Thus Clausewitz's theory of war closely parallels the characteristics of chaos 
theory. 
The aperiodicity of war also manifests itself in the different forms it can tend 
toward: conventional and popular war. The very existence of two distinct types of war 
that arise from the context surrounding its outbreak is, in itself, an example of 
aperiodicity. That war confines itself to a finite range of possibilities from totally 
conventional to totally popular means that it remains deterministic, yet the infinite number 
of ways this may manifest itself- the degree to which it is conventional or popular - shows 
how it can never repeat. In a word, warfare is chaotic. Thus the Gulf War was not a 
repeat of Vietnam as some warned, nor was Vietnam a repeat of Korea as some thought. 
Again, this has ramifications for an external power seeking to intervene in one or 
the other type of war. Accurate assessment of the type of conflict that the intervener is 
getting involved in must determine what type of force is employed and in what manner, 
rather than sending what was effective in the last conflict. George E. Thibault warns: 
The other pitfall is the it's-worked-before school. The military 
especially is, by past experience, as conservative as one might expect a 
profession to be which shoulders the survival of the state. Military 
solutions that have worked in the past are usually the instinctive solution 
for today's problems. This is a natural response and it might be the 
response some of the time. But even situations that look alike may be 
profoundly different. World War III on Europe's Central Front probably 
will not play out like World War II. Yet, the war plans and the equipment 
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we have been building for the past 40 years have not changed very much, 
and we have found to our distress that often they are unsuitable for the 
problems we have been experiencing in the Third World since 1945. But, 
armies head to head, navies seeking the decisive sea battle, and air forces 
planning the big air to air campaign are what we are most comfortable 
with, whatever their faults. (Thibault, 1987: p. 3) 
Conventional wars demand the conventional response of policy backed by force; popular 
wars demand an integrated politico-military response. The success of a conventional force 
in that type of war does not mean that the same force will be successful in a popular war. 
Again, Vietnam provides an excellent example of this: what worked in Korea, a 
conventional war, failed in Vietnam, a popular war. 
B. APERIODICITY AND THE VIETNAM WAR, 1966 - 1971 
The Vietnam War shares many superficial characteristics with the Korean War but 
demonstrates the validity of war's aperiodicity because it was fundamentally different. 
Whereas the latter was primarily a conventional war with some popular components, the 
former was primarily a popular war with some conventional aspects. Larry Cable writes: 
The Vietnam War was a limited war in support of policy. In this it 
resembled the Korean conflict. However, the Vietnam War differed in 
character from its immediate predecessor. It combined aspects of 
conventional and guerrilla war. It mixed insurgency with partisan conflict. 
It had a chameleon appearance as its character changed several times 
between 1964 and 1968. As a result, the formulation of a goal, the 
definition of victory and the development of a theory of victory placed 
greater demands upon the policy makers and military commanders of the 
Johnson Administration. (Cable, 1991: p. vii) 
In this the Vietnam War more closely resembled the United States' involvement in 
countering the Huk rebellion in the Philippines or the communist movement in the Greek 
Civil War. Even these examples, though popular wars, do not provide an exact roadmap 
to success in Vietnam due to the effectiveness of the host government in the former case 
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that was lacking in Vietnam and the ineffectiveness of the opposition in the latter case that 
was absent in the case of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. 
The uniqueness of the Vietnam War in the American experience demanded a 
unique response from MACV. Rather than refighting the Korean War, with its emphasis 
on countering the threat of a cross border invasion by conventional forces, Vietnam 
required a true counterinsurgency effort backed by conventional force as a deterrent to a 
North Vietnamese conventional invasion. Operational plans had to reflect an appreciation 
of the constraints facing MACV: weakening domestic support for the war, a weak host 
government, and a disaffected population with significant sympathy for the enemy. The 
answer was not a replay of the successes of the Korean War or World War II but a 
response tailored to the internal war in Vietnam. 
MACV increasingly feared a cross border invasion of the Republic of Vietnam by 
the North Vietnamese as the United States' involvement deepened. This increased fear 
and attention on that scenario manifest itself in operational plans in two ways: assessment 
of the threat and the employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), which 
were originally intended as the Special Forces' contribution to the pacification effort. 
CIDG's, under the tutelage of the Special Forces, were designed to provide indigenous 
security to populated regions. The program, originally administered by the Central 
Intelligence Agency, came under MACVs control in 1964. In the 1966 combined 
campaign plan, no mention is made of the CIDG, but in the plans from 1967 -1970, the 
CIDG's primary mission is one of border surveillance along the Demilitarized Zone and the 
Cambodian and Laotian borders. (MACV, 1967: p. 15; 1968: p. 9; 1969: p. 9; 1970: p. 
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11) This use of a resource designed for pacification to screen the borders is one example 
of MACVs unwillingness to deviate from the Korean War paradigm. 
Another example of MACVs belief that the situation in Vietnam was analogous to 
the one in Korea over a decade earlier is its assessment of the threat in the combined 
campaign plans. The 1966 plan offers a hopeful start, assuming that there will be no cross 
border attack from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. (MAC V, 1966: p. 152) The 
1967 combined campaign plan drops this assumption and expresses concern over,"... the 
fact that the northern flank of the Allied position in SVN, until recently politically shielded 
by the internationally recognized DMZ, has been exposed." (MACV, 1967: p. 97) It also 
lists as the first probable course of action for the communists a multi - division attack to 
seize the northernmost provinces of the Republic of Vietnam. (MACV, 1967: p. 103) 
After the Tet Offensive, fears of a cross border invasion subsided somewhat, and the plans 
reflect this, although the possibility is never rejected as it was in 1966. The 1970 
campaign plan predicts that the communists will continue to wage a protracted war to 
exhaust the United States' will and continue "proselyting" and guerrilla warfare in the 
populated regions of South Vietnam. (MACV, 1970: p. A-21) MACVs focus on the 
cross border threat - the Korea analogy - thus resembles a normal distribution curve: little 
fear of an overt invasion in 1966 followed by heightened fears in 1967-1968 which 
dwindle by 1971. 
The Republic of Vietnam's Pacification and Development Plan reflects the 
optimism of MACVs planning in the latter phases of its conduct of the war. It states, 










in 1970 all the existing resources will be used for political and economic development in 
order to push forward our victory and expand the area under our control." (RVN, 1970: 
p. 12) Although MACV acknowledged in its analysis of the threats feeing the South 
Vietnam that the cross border invasion was unlikely, it continued to deploy its troops in 
the central highlands to destroy main forces rather than turning to pacification and using 
strategic reserves as a contingency to the diminished conventional threat. 
Combat after - action reports further demonstrate MACVs paranoia concerning a 
cross border invasion. One example of this is the removal of a CIDG camp to a location 
closer to the Cambodian border to conduct surveillance operations in 1967. The 5th 
Special Forces Group report states, "Prek Klok CEDG camp was closed in order to locate 
a new camp at Katum XT332898. COMUSMACV directed that a CIDG camp be placed 
at Katum due to its location astride the major infiltration route running along Highway 
246 from Cambodia." (5th SF, 1967: p. 6) Keeping in mind the original function of the 
Special Forces and CIDG, this mission was inappropriate and detracted from the 
pacification effort. 
General Abrams' LRPTG recognized that the military defeat of the main forces in 
the central highlands and the subsequent removal of the cross border threat did not 
represent final victory for the United States. It states: 
We do now have many of the conditions of a military victory, 
because of a voluntary partial withdrawal of some NVA units from South 
Vietnam and into base areas, and the damage that has been inflicted on 
them and on VC units. But a military victory is aol synonymous with the 
achievement of the ultimate US objectives, does noi end the US effort in 
Vietnam, nor signal the completion of COMUS's mission. (LRPTG, 1969: 
p. 10) 
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Although MACVs combined campaign plans after 1969 reflect the lessened threat posed 
by a cross border invasion, they still emphasize the role of main force units and base areas 
and deploy troops, both conventional and unconventional in such a way as to counter this 
threat rather than the one posed by the VCI. 
MACVs operational planning in Vietnam failed in many respects in its appraisal of 
the Vietnam War's nature and the nature of the enemy it faced. General David R. Palmer 
writes: 
Recent American experiences had been in Korea and World War II, where 
force opposed force, where maps portrayed a neatly defined battlefront, 
where ground taken or lost meant something. Thus, despite numerous and 
unmistakable signs that times and warfare had changed, professional 
military advisors persisted in viewing any potential invasion of South 
Vietnam strictly within the blinders of their own background. So, to shield 
the South from open assault from across the 17th Parallel, American 
advisors and American dollars fashioned an army patterned after those 
forces which had decisively defeated Germany and Japan, and had later 
stopped the Red Chinese in the rugged hills of Korea. (Palmer, 1978: p. 
16) 
Manifestations of this "Korea analogy" occurred in MACVs planning, particularly in 
1967-1968. Particularly damning is MACVs use of Special Forces, experts in 
counterinsurgency and pacification, as reconnaissance and surveillance assets on the 
sparsely populated border regions of the Republic of Vietnam. Andrew Krepinevich 
comments: 
Thus, while working for the CIA, the Army's Special Forces 
effectively emphasized pacification and population security operations. 
However, once CIA control over the CIDG program was terminated, 
MACV quickly reoriented the Special Forces away from their "deviant" 
behavior into missions viewed by the military hierarchy as more appropriate 
and more reflective of the Army Concept. The result was the collapse of 
the pacification program in those areas where Special Forces had been 










program far from the populated areas, against an enemy who, for the most 
part, was operating and receiving sustenance from within South Vietnam. 
(Krepinevich, 1986: p. 75) 
MACV's ability to perceive the uniqueness of the Vietnam War and avoid viewing it 
through the paradigm of the Korean War was, at best mixed. Operational planning in 
Vietnam reflected an appreciation of the aperiodicity of war in its assessment of the 
enemy's capabilities and intentions but failed to act on that knowledge in a meaningful 
way. 
War's aperiodicity does not mean that it is totally random, however. It maintains a 
deterministic nature that means some wars may resemble each other much as the seasons 
resemble each other from year to year. Again, Clausewitz notes the similarities which may 
manifest themselves in warfare by noting the generally linear relationship, excepting 
discontinuities, between the political motives of the war and the means employed to 
achieve them. He writes: 
The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect 
the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that precede the 
outbreak, the closer war will approach its abstract concept, the more 
important will be the destruction of the enemy, the more closely will the 
military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more 
military and less political will war appear to be. On the other hand, the less 
intense the motives, the less will the military element's natural tendency to 
violence coincide with political directives. (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 87) 
Like any chaotic system, war generates both patterns and randomness: it is simultaneously 
orderly and unpredictable. 
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Vm. INTERNAL INSTABILITY 
A. CHAOS, CLAUSEWITZ, AND THE INSTABILITY OF WAR 
The fifth part of Kellert's definition of a chaotic system is its instability. This term 
has a more specific name in chaos theory: sensitive dependence on initial conditions. 
Ruelle states that this characteristic "... means that a small change in the state of the 
system at time zero produces a later change that grows exponentially with time." (Ruelle, 
1991: p. 40) Basically, a chaotic system is unpredictable because seemingly insignificant 
changes or events have profound effects later on. Due to our inability to measure the 
initial conditions of a system with infinite accuracy, we cannot predict how these small 
changes will affect the system. The classic example of this phenomenon, known as the 
butterfly effect, posits that a butterfly fluttering its wings in the Amazon basin can, due to 
the effects of sensitive dependence on initial conditions, cause a hurricane in China as the 
tiny puff of air from its wings causes a long chain reaction. (Gleick, 1987: p. 20) The 
deterministic nature of chaotic systems, however, keeps them from becoming totally 
incomprehensible: there remains a finite, albeit large, set of possible end states for the 
system. The butterfly's effect could just as easily been imperceptible but, in any case, 
would remain confined to a finite range of known weather patterns limited by season and 
geography. Philosophically, this means that human phenomena such as war are 
unpredictable but have a calculable universe of outcomes. 
On War also emphasizes the unpredictability of war caused by sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions. Clausewitz writes in the first chapter of Book One, 








absolute, or certainty; it must always leave a margin for uncertainty, in the greatest things 
as much as in the smallest." (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 86) Although this passage alludes only 
to the uncertainty of dealing with psychological forces, Clausewitz also addresses the 
instability created by war's overall chaotic nature. In the sixth chapter of Book Two he 
writes: 
Undoubtedly, the knowledge basic to the art of war is empirical. While, 
for the most part, it is derived from the nature of things, this very nature is 
usually revealed to us only by experience. Its application, moreover, is 
modified by so many conditions that its effects can never be completely 
established merely from the nature of the means. (Clausewitz, 1989: 
p. 170) 
Despite the empirical basis of its constituent parts - its dynamic and deterministic aspects - 
it remains unpredictable because those parts cannot be measured to a perfect degree of 
accuracy. Beyerchen writes: 
The overall pattern is clear: war seen as a nonlinear phenomenon - as 
Clausewitz sees it - is inherently unpredictable by analytical means. Chance 
and complexity dominate simplicity in the real world... No theory can 
provide the analytical short - cuts necessary to allow us to skip ahead of 
the "running" of an actual war. (Beyerchen, 1993: p. 90) 
Again, the link between chaos theory and On War becomes ever clearer with the addition 
of instability from sensitive dependence on initial conditions to Clausewitz's treatment of 
war. 
Like Clausewitz's concept of friction, war's instability manifests itself in different 
ways in popular and conventional wars. In the latter it primarily affects the deployed 
forces and intervenes at the tactical and operational level. Once the state establishes a 
clear political goal, the operational commander may take steps to reduce the effect of this 
unpredictability on his own force and increase it for the enemy. These steps include 
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reliance on technological and material solutions, as well as centralized command and 
control. The Gulf War remains a classic example of this: the war followed a relatively 
predictable course because the United States employed a major preponderance of force. 
Popular wars, however, exhibit instability in a different way because of the linkage 
between ends and means and the direct involvement of the population in the conflict. 
Unpredictability manifests itself in the political sphere and cannot be overcome by material 
solutions because the contest is primarily a psychological one. Attempts to do so are 
ineffective at best and inimicable at worst. The United States attempted to overcome the 
role of chance in war in Vietnam, but its material based solutions only exacerbated the 
political problems faced by itself and its protege, the Republic of South Vietnam. 
The different manifestations of instability in war have different implications for an 
external intervening power. Returning for a moment to Garry Wills' categorization of 
friction into internal and external varieties, the role friction in conventional wars has 
different implications than that encountered in an internal war. He writes, "Internally, 
remember, friction chews at an army even in success. Externally, the military 
transformations {Wechselwirkung) cause a disconnect from the politicaluses of war." 
(Wills, 1994: p. 94) In conventional war, attempts to overcome unpredictability must 
focus on the center of gravity of each side: its military power. Thus force protection on 
the one hand and decimation of the opposing side's force is the key, and material solutions 
lend themselves to this form of conflict and its internal friction. In popular wars, in 
contrast, attempts to overcome instability must focus on a different center of gravity: the 
link between the people and the host government or insurgents. Thus population 
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protection that focuses on preserving the state - people link and attacks the insurgent - 
people link is paramount. Material solutions play a role but are more focused on 
pacification than on firepower, and the primary realm of protection is in the political and 
psychological spheres and should focus more on countering external friction. 
B. INSTABILITY IN THE VIETNAM WAR, 1966 - 1971 
The butterfly effect manifested itself in Vietnam on the political will of the United 
States by magnifying and transferring the effects of chance and the United States' attempts 
to control it into the political realm. The tight linkage of ends and means characteristic of 
popular wars prevented the United States from effectively responding to chance in the way 
it was used to; via material solutions. Roger Beaumont writes: 
Many American military and government officials, including those 
otherwise supportive of American involvement, criticized such techniques 
as the products of overdependence on "hardware" and symptomatic of a 
general lack of coherent policy. The tangled nexus of organizations, the 
bewildering arrays of equipment and ill - formed strategies and concepts 
were seen as complexity or chaos per se, or as the consequence of faulty 
organization and policies. Assessing the effect of any particular system or 
device of the many dozens employed was complicated by the dynamic of 
the Vietnam War, which saw very few major sustained battles or fixed lines 
of contact, but was mainly a fluidic and fragmented montage of flickering 
and formless patterns that thwarted the attempts of the Americans and 
South Vietnamese to plot trends and develop a coherent format. Immersed 
in that ambiguity, some military professionals hungered for the relative 
linearity of earlier conflicts and freedom from constraints on use of force. 
(Beaumont, 1994: p. 137) 
The programs, policies, and devices mentioned in this passage were not applied randomly 
or in an attempt to wage a genocidal war against the Vietnamese, but represented the 
conventional response to chance which seeks the destruction of the enemy's armed force 




The role of chance in a popular war such as the one in Vietnam in the 1966 -1971 
time frame demanded a response that focused more on population protection than force 
protection. MAC Vs plans should have restricted coercion to specific targets and 
relegated firepower to a secondary role behind pacification. Material solutions needed to 
focus more on winning the population's support and less on seeking and destroying 
communist main force units. Operational plans needed to distribute resources and offer 
specific guidelines to subordinate headquarters that responded to the effects of chance in 
the political realm rather than the tactical one. 
MACVs combined campaign plans largely focused on the military effort to destroy 
communist main forces rather than on population protection, as the context of a popular 
war dictates. The theory of victory espoused in the campaign plans illustrates this. This 
theory of victory is not overtly stated in the 1966 or 1967 plans, but does occur under the 
rubric of goals in which are intended to measure progress during the course of the year in 
the plans from 1968 to 1971. In general, MACVs combined campaign plans at the 
beginning and end of its involvement give population protection equal weight with the 
military effort but allow the military effort to dominate in the years 1967 -1969. 
The 1966 combined campaign plan does not contain any specific goals or measures 
of effectiveness but does give security for the population some measure of importance. 
The campaign"... has as its basic objective to clear, secure and assist in development in 
the heavily populated areas around Saigon, in the Mekong Delta, and in selected portions 
of the coastal plain." (MAC V, 1966: p. 153) Search and destroy missions are mentioned 









population protection was more important than force protection in this section of the 
campaign plan. 
The 1967 combined campaign plan contrasts sharply with its predecessor, although 
it, too, does not list specific measures of effectiveness. Its theory of victory is also in the 
objective of the campaign, which is now "To defeat VC/NVA forces," followed by "To 
extend GVN control in the Republic of Vietnam." (MACV, 1967: p. 2) Population 
security is no longer the main goal; destruction of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese 
main forces has become an end in itself. Its position, superior to or at least coequal with 
the main focus of a popular war demonstrates the increasing focus on force protection 
because MACVs attention is increasingly drawn to the enemy that threatens its military 
forces rather than the population. 
The 1968 combined campaign plan follows the general trend of the previous year, 
but explicitly lists its measures of effectiveness. The top five (out of twenty-five) are: 
(1) Render ineffective all enemy main and local force units. 
(2) Inflict losses on the VC/NVA forces at a rate greater than the enemy 
can replace. 
(3) Neutralize by end CY 1968 80% of the identified enemy base areas in 
RVN and capture or destroy his installations and caches. 
(4) Increase the effectiveness of measures to deny the enemy use of coastal 
and inland waterways for the movement of men and materiel. 
(5) Increase surveillance and operations along province boundaries. 
(MACV, 1969: p. 4) 
The list continues in this vein until goal thirteen, which is the first specific mention of 
pacification and security for the population. 
The 1969 campaign plan is an improvement over the 1968 one but still falls short 
of devoting adequate attention to population protection measures. Its top five goals are: 
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(1) Organize, equip, modernize, and employ the RVNAF to achieve a 
maximum state of combat effectiveness. 
(2) Inflict more losses on the enemy than he can replace. 
(3) Increase the percent of the population and territory under GVN control 
through an expanded pacification effort. 
(4) Reduce the ability of the enemy to conduct ground attacks or attacks 
by fire against population centers, economic areas, and bases. 
(5) Deny the maximum number of base area sanctuaries in SVN to the 
enemy by their destruction or continuous neutralization. (MACV, 1969: 
p. 4) 
Although population security makes the top five (out often) goals, it falls after the mission 
to make the South Vietnamese Army more combat effective, i.e., more proficient in large 
unit operations against main force units, and the attrition of enemy forces. 
The 1970 and 1971 plans represent the best effort at population protection but 
continue to stress the large unit war. Their top five goals are identical and call for full 
implementation of the Republic of Vietnam's Pacification and Development Plan, 
increasing the combat effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Army, employment ofthat 
army in accordance with their assigned missions and capabilities, replacement of regular 
forces with territorial ones for pacification duties, and attrition of enemy forces. (MACV, 
1970: pp. 4-6; 1971: pp. 4-5) These plans place the security effort at the top of the list, 
where it belongs in a popular war, but simultaneously undermine this effort by training and 
employing the South Vietnamese Army as a conventional force in the large unit war. 
MACVs plans started out focusing on the population rather than on its own conventional 
forces but, as the United States' involvement increased, so too did MACVs emphasis on 
the conventional aspect of the war in Vietnam. In the latter years of American 
involvement, during" Vietnamization1' of the war, the pacification effort again rose in 










MACVs operational plans, particularly in 1967 -1969, contrasted sharply with the 
Republic of Vietnam's Pacification and Development Plans in terms of their approaches to 
security. The plan offers a description of security from the viewpoint of the peasant: 
(1) The Vietnamese villager fears military forces of both sides, since their 
operations constitute a threat to the safety of him and his family. He fears 
friendly artillery and air as much as he fears enemy mortars and rockets. 
(2) Military commanders frequently judge security as it relates to the 
safety of their units, rather than to the population in the area. For example, 
a battalion commander may feel that he is providing security to the people 
simply by being in the area. Frequently, however, the mere presence of a 
military unit within an area provokes an enemy attack. (RVN, 1970: p.I- 
1-2) 
MACVs concept of security envisioned protection from communist main force units 
operating in South Vietnam and infiltrating from the border areas. This concept focused 
on the preservation of military power vested in large units rather than focusing on the 
activities of the VCI in the hamlets. Further, by using concentrated units supported by 
artillery and air strikes, the efforts to enhance force protection worsened the security level 
of the population. 
Combat after - action reports corroborate the tendency of friendly forces to use 
indirect fire and air strike assets to protect military forces. A battalion sized operation 
conducted by the 173rd Airborne Brigade in 1966 had, at its disposal an entire battery of 
105mm howitzers and a platoon of eight inch artillery, as well as tactical air and armed 
helicopters. (173rd, 1966: p. 1) Units did not always use these assets in a discriminate 
manner, understandably preferring to attack a hostile hamlet by fire rather than clearing it 
in person. A report of a squadron sized operation from the 11th Armored Cavalry 
Regiment in 1967 describes its use of indirect fire provided by the provisional battalion of 
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artillery, both 105mm and 155mm, supporting it: "Each evening when the line troops 
assumed their positions, artillery fired defensive concentrations in their areas. These fires 
were continued throughout the night as part of the H and I program." (1 IthACR, 1967: 
p. 3) The random nature of artillery employment, especially in harrassment and 
interdiction (H&I) fires, ensured that the population's security was threatened in a very 
real way. In fact, the harrassment and interdiction missions accounted for the vast 
majority of artillery usage in Vietnam, 3,977 out of a total of 6,261 in the mission 
described above. (Ibid.) Thus MACVs focus on concentrated use of force and emphasis 
on force protection via firepower undermined the security of the population. 
General Abrams' LRPTG recognized the negative effects of feedback from the 
large unit war into the pacification effort. It concluded with several recommendations for 
MACV, among which was to, "Complete the remaining stage of the 'war of the battalions.' 
But continue your insistence on reduction of the boomerang effects (creation of refugees, 
avoidable casualties, unbalanced damage.)" (LRPTG, 1969: p. 31) MACV never put 
population security in the proper perspective for an effective response to the popular war 
in Vietnam. General Harold Moore comments, "The same awesome firepower - artillery, 
airstrikes, and ARA - that had saved our lives in the unpopulated la Drang Valley now, 
despite our best efforts, began taking a toll of innocent civilians killed and maimed, 
villages destroyed, and farm animals slain." (Moore, 1992: p. 403) MACV was on the 
horns of a dilemma: the attempts to prevent American casualties so important to the war 
effort in the United States caused it to rely heavily on concentrated firepower which, in 
turn, alienated the very population that MACV was charged with protecting. 
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The presence of sensitive dependence on initial conditions does not imply total 
anarchy, however. Chance events do not always dominate the system; their presence may 
be irrelevant. To illustrate this consider the well known verse that describes the role of 
chance in war: 
For want of a nail, the shoe was lost; 
For want of a shoe, the horse was lost; 
For want of a horse, the rider was lost; 
For want of a rider, the message was lost; 
For want of the message, the battle was lost; 
For want of a battle, the kingdom was lost; 
All for the want of a nail! 
Victory in the battle could have depended just as much on the message's never getting 
there if it contained erroneous or misleading information. The rider may have continued 
on despite the lost shoe and delivered the message. In any case, the system is not a 
hostage to chance yet the possibility for chance to play a great role exists. Thus 
Clausewitz counsels, "The good general must know friction in order to overcome it 
whenever possible, and in order not to expect a standard of achievement in his operations 
which this very friction makes impossible." (Clausewitz, 1989: p. 120) Therefore 
Clausewitzian friction, another name for chance, is an active part of war but is not the 





IX. QUALITY, NOT QUANTITY 
A. CHAOS, CLAUSEWriZ, AND WAR AS A QUALITATIVE PHENOMENON 
The last aspect of Kellert's definition of chaos is its qualitative nature. Due to the 
inability to determine the exact initial conditions of a chaotic system, chaos theory 
concerns itself with describing the system's characteristics rather than attempting to 
predict its outcome. It does this by means of fractional dimension, or fractals. An 
example of fractals is the shape or roughness of a coastline, which has an infinite length if 
one attempts to measure every twist and turn on it down to the smallest, microscopic 
scale. The degree of twist and turn in the coastline, however, is describable using 
fractional dimension, and remains constant at every scale. In other words, a magnified 
photo of one meter of coastline would qualitatively resemble an aerial photo of several 
kilometers of the same coastline; it is a fractal phenomenon. CHeick describes the role of 
fractals in chaos theory, "Fractional dimension becomes a way of measuring qualities that 
otherwise have no clear definition: the degree of roughness or irregularity in an object." 
(CHeick, 1987: p. 98) For war, this means that chaos theory provides a qualitative view of 
war as it is rather than a quantitative view of war as the analyst wants it to be. 
Clausewitz also accounts for this phenomenon in On War through its qualitative 
rather than quantitative approach. Paret identifies this qualitative approach as 
phenomenological in nature. He writes: 
Phenomenologjcal abstraction, on the other hand, - Wesenshau, Husserl 
called it - seeks the essence of things, tries to establish the properties a 
thing must have to be that kind of a thing. It begins not with many 
phenomena but with the single phenomenon, and it need not investigate 











combined intensive analysis of the structure of war itself with broad 
historical comparisons. Basically, however, he took a single phenomenon, 
varied it in imagination to see what properties were essential to it and what 
properties could be removed in thought without effecting its essence. 
(Paret, 1985: p. 58) 
Clausewitz's phenomenologjcal approach becomes clear in the second chapter of Book 
Two, which discusses the role of theory in the study of war. He writes: 
Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the 
constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight 
seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to 
show their probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends in view, 
and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry. 
(Clausewitz, 1989: p. 141) 
This qualitative approach to war means that Clausewitz's theory applies to any level of war 
at any time. This universality, known in chaos theory as fractional dimension, means that 
a chaotic system, like war, exhibits chaotic behavior at all levels. Nichols and Tagarev 
tested warfare against historical data related to war and determined that,"... warfare is 
chaotic at the grand strategic, strategic, and operational level." (Nichols and Tagarev, 
1994: p. 49) Clausewitz's entire approach to war, and the essence of his theory resembles 
chaos theory in principle due to its qualitative and fractal approach. 
War's qualitative difference, its tendency to be of the conventional or popular type, 
is the at the heart of chaos theory and Clausewitz's phenomenological approach to the 
subject. A Harvard University National Security Program Discussion Paper entitled 
"Between Peace and War: Comprehending Low Intensity Conflict" highlights this 
typological difference: 
Low intensity conflict is qualitatively different from war. It is 
commonly perceived, however, as the low end of a continuous conflict 












war. The Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project highlighted some differences: 
"The term 'low intensity' suggests a contrast to mid - or high - intensity 
conflict ~ a spectrum of warfare. Low-intensity conflict, however, cannot 
be understood to mean simply the degree of violence involved. Low- 
intensity conflict has more to do with the nature of the violence — the 
strategy that guides it and the way individuals engage each other in it — 
than with level or numbers." The essence of LIC emerges in the above 
quote. (Crane, et al., 1988: p. 18) 
Although I have rejected the term "low intensity conflict" in favor of popular war, the 
theme remains the same: the two forms of war, conventional and popular, are distinct 
types rather than ends of a spectrum. Conventional wars of any size exhibit the same 
characteristics in the interaction of their subsystems at every level from tactical to 
strategic. These characteristics have been discussed in the previous chapters and, when 
taken in aggregate, represent the distinction between it and popular war. In short, 
conventional war is manifest by autonomous military action concentrated in space and 
time pursuing variable political goals established by a centralized state apparatus. The 
Gulf War was all of these, and the United States successfully prosecuted the war because 
it recognized the nature of the conflict and acted accordingly. 
Popular wars, in contrast, exhibit limited military action by forces integrated into 
society pursuing total political goals established by a decentralized political apparatus. 
The Vietnam War from 1965 -1972 is an example of this type of war, and the United 
States' failure to recognize it as an internal war contributed substantially to its defeat. At 
its heart conventional war centers on military force; internal war on political and 
psychological persuasion. 
The qualitative difference between popular and conventional war means that an 
external intervener must decide what kind of war it is facing then act accordingly. Using 
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the aforementioned specific characteristics of war is one vehicle for identifying whether 
the conflict is conventional or popular. Once this is determined the intervener must 
employ correspondingly different types of force: police-centered, host nation dominated 
force in the case of popular war, and military-centered force in the case of conventional 
war. 
B. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM WAR, 1966 - 1971 
The Vietnam War was distinctly of the popular type until its transition to the final 
conventional stage in 1975. Qualitatively, the war consisted of an indigenous insurgency 
embodied in the Viet Cong that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam successfully 
"captured" after the decimation of the Tet Offensive. Even after the North Vietnamese 
takeover, the war retained its popular nature due to the Northerners' ability to use the 
existing organization, the VCI, to remain tied to the population. After the unsuccessful 
conventional attempts of 1968 and 1972, the conventional effort succeeded in 1975. 
Larry Cable describes the characteristics of an insurgency that apply to Vietnam: 
Insurgents are the armed expression of political discontent and disaftlliation 
arising organically from conditions within society as a result of the actions 
of the government under attack. Insurgents in the main rely upon their 
own exertions for supplies, intelligence, manpower and the other 
necessities of war. They set their own agenda and goals. Ultimately, they 
must look to themselves and the society they claim to represent for victory 
or defeat. While an insurgent organization might attempt to internationalize 
a conflict and might seek material or other assistance from an external 
source, it will not allow the vitiation of its agenda or goals. The external 
power is the auxiliary of the insurgent. Quite obviously, the two disparate 
forms of war require fundamentally different types of counter. (Cable, 
1991: p. 6) 
This generic description of a popular war applies to the Vietnam War with the addition of 







after 1968. The addition of direct North Vietnamese participation and introduction of 
PAVN forces changed the conflict superficially, but their successful manipulation of the 
population via the VCI ensured that the conflict remained fundamentally of a popular type. 
A popular war requires a response that first and foremost addresses the political, 
economic, and social needs of the population. Chief among these is security, but the host 
government or its mentor must achieve this security at the local level. Defending the 
population against an ethereal conventional threat while a real one lurks at the local level 
does not provide meaningful security for the population. MACVs plans in Vietnam, 
therefore, should have offered an integrated politico - military solution to the problems 
facing the peasantry in the Mekong Delta and coastal plains by establishing effective 
control of the population. Conventional war, though certainly part of any operational 
plan, should be treated as a contingency and complement to the overall counterinsurgency 
effort. 
MACV never successfully combined the various aspects of counterinsurgency in 
its operational planning. The combined campaign plans for each year had some aspects 
that effectively addressed the popular component of the war, but each one had some other 
guidance that negated those passages. Further, the allocation of resources and attention 
invariably went to the conventional aspect of the war rather than the popular one, no 
matter what the campaign or pacification plans stated. The qualitative nature of MACVs 
operational planning simply did not match the context of the struggle in which it was 
engaged, and this contributed to the eventual defeat of the United States and Republic of 
Vietnam. 
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The 1966 plan focused its mission largely on the defense of logistics bases and 
large towns and cities. While there is nothing inherently wrong with these efforts, the 
main effort of a popular war, providing security to the bulk of the population, was 
neglected because South Vietnam was largely a rural, peasant society at the time. Further, 
it identified main force units as the major threat facing the Republic of Vietnam rather than 
the VCI and located the enemy center of gravity in North Vietnam rather than within the 
Viet Cong. Lastly, the 1966 plan failed to protect the population from collateral damage 
and encouraged the use of air and naval forces to destroy the enemy. The failure to 
recognize the war in Vietnam as a popular one contributed to this focus and led to the 
misallocation of resources into the conventional military struggle to the detriment of the 
pacification effort. 
The 1967 combined campaign plan called for United States forces to destroy the 
communist main forces while South Vietnamese units took care of pacification. This 
focused more attention on the pacification effort and, indeed, the counter VCI effort was 
supposed to receive increased emphasis in this year. Concomitant with this apparent 
improvement, however, was increasing concern over the threat of main forces attacking 
across international boundaries and the establishment of base areas inside South Vietnam. 
Further, the guidance on application of force in populated areas was still vague and the 
1967 order encouraged the use of B-52 strikes for the purpose of neutralizing Viet Cong 
base areas - inside the Republic of Vietnam. This continued to alienate the bulk of the 
population in the countryside and blurred the lines between "friendly" and "enemy." Using 
United States forces exclusively to combat main force units signalled a rise in American 
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casualties and eroded support for the war at home. Further, this use placed greater 
emphasis on the military aspects of the war than the pacification effort received: a reversal 
of the priorities called for in popular war. 
The 1968 combined campaign plan continues the division of labor established the 
year before but no longer focuses on the VCI as the major threat. Rather, it views the 
cross border threat as paramount, and gives the central highlands a prominent place for 
operations. This was good because the area was sparsely populated but irrelevant for the 
same reason: the real war was in the hamlets where the VCI maintained control of much 
of the population. Again, there is little emphasis on rules of engagement or otherwise 
protecting the population from the effects of friendly operations. MACVs attention was, 
therefore, drawn from the coastal plains to the central highlands beginning in this year. 
The 1968 campaign plan, like the others, had some good points such as mentioning the 
VCI in several places and emphasizing the coastal plains and Mekong Delta regions, but in 
general it failed to give these areas either the quantitative or qualitative support they 
deserved. 
The 1969 order closely resembles the 1968 one but comes up with a new division 
of labor: South Vietnamese regular troops join United States forces in combat against the 
communist main forces and the pacification effort goes to the territorial forces. The VCI 
continues to occupy some space in the plan but most discussion of the threat concerns the 
operations of main force units both inside and outside of the Republic of Vietnam. Rules 
of engagement or other guidance on the use of force continue to be largely ignored. The 
"Vietnamization" effort had the net effect of pulling even more resources out of the 
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pacification effort as South Vietnamese regular forces switched to the large unit war. 
Large operations contributed to the refugee problem and alienated the population due to 
indiscriminate firepower. MACVs operational planning thus continued its trend of 
treating the pacification effort as the "other" war and concentrating on what it felt was the 
decisive area. It proved to be incorrect. 
The 1970 and 1971 combined campaign plans closely mirrored each other and 
placed the most emphasis to date on the pacification effort - going so far as to make it the 
primary mission. The counter VCI effort, too, was identified as a top priority and given 
emphasis throughout the orders. It also correctly assessed that the communists were in no 
position to launch a major cross border operation. Counteracting these positive 
developments were a continued silence on rules of engagement and the use of regular 
forces primarily as counters to communist main forces in the Republic of Vietnam. 
General Abrams' "one war" strategy briefed well but was never fully pursued by MACV, 
which focused on the large unit war and extraction of American units from Vietnam. 
The Republic of Vietnam's Pacification and Development Plan rightly stated the 
appropriate mission of military forces in the Vietnam War: 
RVNAF, assisted by FWMAF, and in conjunction with civil elements, 
provides security to the population throughout RVN, thus providing an 
environment in which other Pacification and Development (PD) Programs 
can be safely and successfully implemented. (RVN, 1970: p. 1-1) 
MACVs definition of security contrasted sharply with the one described in the pacification 
plan. For MACV, security meant inviolable borders and the elimination of base areas and 
main force units in South Vietnam. For the population, security meant a safe hamlet in 




in Vietnam. The way to effect this was through a police oriented, permanent presence at 
the hamlet level to eliminate the VCI and build popular trust in the government. MACVs 
operational planning did not focus on this aspect of the war, which contributed to its 
defeat because the Vietnam War was a popular war in which the population's security was 
more important than that of the military forces engaged therein. 
Combat after - action reports reflect MACVs focus on the large unit war and the 
reliance on firepower that United States forces exhibited. The intelligence portions of the 
reports focus on communist main forces and infiltration routes. Relatively small units, 
such as battalions and squadrons, had major amounts of artillery and air power at their 
disposal: firepower they did not hesitate to use. Employment of massive firepower was 
by no means discriminate. The after - action reports show how MACVs guidance was 
operationalized by United States forces and indicate a misunderstanding of the war's 
nature. Rather than dispersing and conducting counterinsurgency operations by living 
with the population, American units concentrated in large bases and sallied out on large 
unit missions to wreak havoc on enemy forces - which they did with regularity and 
precision. Unfortunately, the popular aspect of the Vietnam required the former type of 
force, not the latter. 
General Abrams' LRPTG was very perceptive in identifying MACVs shortcomings 
and the political constraints facing that headquarters in 1969. It concludes, "Finally, the 
bulk of the US effort, (including planning) understandably, but persistently remains 
focused on the shooting war, with the result that fundamental socio-economic-political 
problems underlying the insurgency continue to be relatively neglected." (LRPTG, 1969: 
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p. 28) MACV attempted to rectify this via the "one war" strategy articulated in the 1970 
and 1971 plans, but the main focus of the war continued to be on its conventional aspects 
rather than on the pacification effort. In fact the very conduct of the conventional war 
undermined the pacification effort by continuing to alienate the population. 
MACVs operational planning had to adapt to the peculiar environment facing it in 
Vietnam: a hybrid of popular and conventional war with the former posing the main threat. 
Larry Cable describes the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's effectiveness in limiting 
MACVs options: 
The possibility that the North Vietnamese were in the process of 
trapping the US in an unsolvable dilemma was not considered by the 
American military high command. The nature of the dilemma was easy to 
see and is even implied in the JCS draft presidential memorandum. By 
inveigling the US into a continuation of the "big war' of search and destroy 
operations against the PAVN and Viet Cong main force units, the North 
could assure continued social, political, and economic chaos within South 
Vietnam. This would impair efforts at pacification and nation building and 
a continuation of American losses without apparent useful result. Thus 
political will within South Vietnam and the United States would be 
undercut. The use of sanctuaries along the DMZ and Cambodian borders 
allowed PAVN and the Viet Cong main forces to tie down a significant 
percentage of American ground combat strength. By using the Viet Cong 
main forces as the primary offensive instrument, Hanoi could use Southern 
blood to further ablate American will. If the US diverted its ground 
resources to deal with pacification, the PAVN force in being could threaten 
a spectacularly successful operation against a population center such as 
Quang Tri City, Hue, or Pleiku, again undercutting American and South 
Vietnamese political will. Hanoi could rely on the ongoing air war against 
the North to maintain and consolidate the popular support of its citizens for 
the war, particularly for the expansive goal of unification under Northern 
control. (Cable, 1991: p. 162) 
MACV never resolved the dilemma facing it despite the different combinations of 
programs contained in the combined campaign plans. At the risk of presenting a 
counterfactual solution to the dilemma, operational planning that gave consistent priority 
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to the pacification effort, maintained a healthy strategic reserve, and prepared contingency 
plans to deal with main force offensives in the central highlands may have served United 
States' and South Vietnamese interests better than the large unit focus of the plans MACV 
ended up with. 
The qualitative nature of chaos theory and Clausewitz's theory of war does not 
mean, however, that nothing in the system or in warfare is quantifiable. The example of 
the impact of superior numbers in an engagement or of the constant influence of gravity on 
a spacecraft demonstrate this. These components of a system are quantifiable and do 
affect the system, yet the system maintains its chaotic nature. Like the presence of 
linearities within chaotic systems, quantifiable phenomena within a system that can only be 




Kellert's definition of chaos theory, then, offers a framework with which one can 
analyze human phenomena such as war. It offers an epistemological break with the 
predictive and linear concepts of the past and forces the student of war to rethink some of 
the interpretations of Clausewitz and other military theorists. James Gleick summarizes 
the scope of chaos theory: 
In science as in life, it is well known that a chain of events can have a point 
of crisis that could magnify small changes. But chaos meant that such 
points were everywhere. They were pervasive. In systems like the 
weather, sensitive dependence on initial conditions was an inescapable 
consequence of the way small scales intertwined with large. (Gleick, 1987: 
p. 23) 
Using chaos theory, therefore, becomes a valuable way to view human activities such as 
war due to its qualitative approach to systems that are simultaneously unstable and 
deterministic. 
Chaos theory also provides a vehicle with which one can gain a clearer 
understanding of the nature of war and of Clausewitz's attempts to formulate a theory that 
accurately describes its essential parts. Michael Mazarr notes in his monograph entitled, 
"The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning": 
The essentially chaotic nature of world politics is mirrored in warfare. 
Combat itself is a chaotic enterprise, dominated by such elements as 
feedback, sensitive dependence on initial conditions, and chance. At least 
one observer [Beyerchen] contends that this conclusion represents 
Clausewitz's central message. (Mazarr, 1994: p. 7) 
The unique combination of a dynamical and deterministic system which exhibits sensitive 






itself. That Clausewitz's theory so closely mirrored the philosophical tenets of chaos 
theory some 150 years prior to its formulation is uncanny and underscores the continuing 
relevance of his work. 
War's dual nature, highlighted by viewing it through the lens of chaos theory, 
makes the conceptualization of it important to an external intervener such as the United 
States in the Vietnam War. MAC Vs inability to recognize what it was facing, a popular 
war with conventional overtones, led it to prepare operational plans that failed to address 
the most serious problems facing the Republic of Vietnam. The unpredictability of war 
and the nonlinear nature of the feedback from the means it employed negated whatever 
linear advantages the United States possessed. 
Drawing general conclusions from history is a difficult task and is fraught with 
dangers for those who use history as a vehicle for teaching "lessons learned." As historian 
Donald Abenheim counsels, "Beware the pitfalls of anachronism and determinism that 
derive from bucaneering with the evidence." (Abenheim, 1995: p. 1) At the risk of over 
generalizing from MACVs experience in Vietnam, it is safe to say that identification of 
what type of war one is facing is a good start. Gordon McCormick developed a set of five 
general rules for a state to follow before getting involved in a conflict that do this very 
thing. They are sequential and must be repeated often due to the dynamical nature of war: 
1) Question your assumptions. 2) Determine the nature of the problem: conventional or 
popular war? 3) Determine the appropriate solution set: conventional or 
counterinsurgency response? 4) Evaluate the host state's strengths and weaknesses. 5) 







approach to war forces one to do the first of these because of the nonlinearity and 
instability of chaotic systems such as war; one can never assume that the system is 
progressing as the original prediction projected. It also provides the answer to the second 
question - to what degree is the war popular or conventional? Viewing war through chaos 
theory's lens provides the answer to this question by differentiating the ways that war's 
essential components interact in the two types of conflict. Once the nature of the problem 
is apparent, then the relatively straightforward processes of choosing appropriate and 
feasible solutions and conducting a costs - benefits analysis can occur. 
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APPENDIX A. COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLAN MAPS, 1966 - 1971 
The maps that follow, on pages 134 through 140 are copies of the maps included 
in MACVs Combined Campaign Plans from 1966 - 1971. They show the areas in which 
MACV intended to focus its attention for that year. Although the format differs slightly 
from year to year, one can see the general pattern of MACVs attention using the graphics 
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APPENDIX B. PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT, 1970 - 1971 
The following table and key, taken from MACV's 1970 Combined Campaign Plan, 
shows the perceived threats facing the Vietnamese peasant living in South Vietnam An 
identical table appeared in the Republic of Vietnam's Pacification and Development Plan 
and MACV's 1971 Combined Campaign Plan. 
TYPES 
CROP  DESTRUCTION 
TAXATION 
IMPRESSMENT,   KIDNAPPING 
ASSASSINATION 
TERRORIST   ATTACKS 
GROUND   OPERATIONS 
MORTAR /ARTILLERY 





PERCEIVED    BY 
VILLAGER 
LOCAL   SECURITY  FORCE 
LOCAL    GVN   OFFICIALS 
GVN   LEADERS 
US   MILITARY   IN  SVN 
KEY 
ENEMY" (VC/NVA) 
^     "FRIENDLY" (US/FWMAF/ RVNAF) 
BOTH   "ENEMY','    "FRIENDLY" 
141 
P I  . I  , 1 0 - 1971 
The follo ing ta le a  e , t  fr  Y'   ined a paign Plan, 
shows the percei  t r t  faci  t i t  t li ing in South Vietnam An 
identical table appeare  in t  li  i t ' i i ti  and evelop ent Plan 
  i  aign Plan. 
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